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## PREFACE

THIS book does not deal with the horrors of war. It is an analysis of war as a psychological and moral disease and its purpose is to indicate treatment, by way of cure, before another onset of the war-fever. But the same kind of argument was attempted by Erasmus in the sixteenth century and by Novikov in the nineteenth, and both failed to convince those in control of public policy. The only advantage we have, as compared with Erasmus, is the much greater number of those not in control of public policy who can read and communicate across frontiers. The recent reaction to barbarism under Fascist and Nazi leadership may result in war, but the disease is at least not regarded as inevitable by the majority to-day. In the elimination of war we are in a position like that of the industrial cities of the early nineteenth century with regard to cholera. We no longer accept the disease as part of the nature of things, but we have not yet secured a supply of pure water in our schools or on our political platforms from other sources than the village pump. This little book can hardly be expected to do more than indicate why affection for that village pump should not prevent the use of a somewhat healthier

source for our public policy, less likely to cause disease

The argument of the book is this War is a survival irreconcilable with modern civilization It is maintained to-day by a psychological "defence" complex, supported by ancient institutions, such as the officer class, and by traders who derive gain from it Romantic historians perpetuate the obsolete moral standards implied in old chronicles, and diplomats, partly under the influence of the war departments of Governments, sometimes practise sovereignty in the sense of moral irresponsibility The theory of sovereignty, however, which seeks to excuse war, involves omission of some of the facts of actual intercourse between States, especially the appeal to moral right as a justification of policy Consistently with that occasional appeal, a gradual elimination of the disease of war has begun, chiefly through the League of Nations War is becoming less respectable But a long period of psychological-educational treatment will probably have to occur before war becomes altogether obsolete Influences outside the art of government are already tending to civilise the manners and customs of those in control of the public policy of almost every State in its relations with other States

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Glasgow,  
February, 1934

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## CHAPTER I

### THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR

WAR is a disease. It is partly a psychological abnormality and partly a cancer in political institutions. But disease may be so common that most of those who suffer from it believe it to be normal and inevitable, as some African tribes regard the malaria which has depressed their vitality for generations. And the effects of disease may be honoured, as slashes on the face are honoured among the more barbaric university students in Germany who practise duelling. Flags and trumpets give some attractiveness to killing men.

But war is fundamentally a moral evil. It is a disease, because it is the use of violence instead of reasoning and persuasion in the relations between men. It is the treatment of men as if they were beasts or physical forces, which degrades to that level both sides in the conflict. A man may be either driven by external force, or drawn by an influence which works within him when he is moved by reason. But if driven by external force, he is not a man, and he who thus drives men is not a man. It does not follow that soldiers are villains. Indeed they may be most virtuous, as a

man set upon by a lunatic may be virtuous in resistance. But the virtue of the soldier does not excuse the evil of those social conditions which permit lunacy to run loose, and for the delay in removing that general condition called war, all of us are morally responsible. The great majority of the citizens of all States still believe that in dealing with citizens of other States violence and not persuasion is the right method. That belief is a moral disease. It is a disease not because it inflicts suffering, but because to use the organised power for destruction as a means of maintaining claims to rights is a repudiation of moral standards in the relations between men. War belongs to the social conditions in which cannibalism, slavery, the burning of heretics and the torture of witnesses at trials were common. The problem for us now is why, when all these other diseases of society have disappeared, war still continues to be possible.

War is an elaborate and complex institutional practice of States and their governments. It is not a result of passion and it has very little relation to street fights or to the impulsiveness due to a supposed instinct of pugnacity. War is an instrument of policy. In our days it requires great preparation in storage of material and readiness of manufacturing capacity. It cannot be carried on by a sudden seizing of sticks and stones. War leads good young brains to the discovery of new poison-gas and more deadly guns. It involves spying on all possible enemies and therefore the braining of citizens to

betray their country. It cannot be understood by those who look only at the emotions of crowds or the enthusiasm of soldiers. It is part of the structure of government, maintained by all kinds of strange habits and beliefs in many different persons.

Like all diseases, however, war provides great opportunities for the practice of magnificent virtues. The facing of risk, the endurance of pain, comradeship in danger and above all devotion to a common good—all are found in war, as among the sufferers and their helpers in leprosy or tuberculosis. And if war can be believed to be inevitable, as professional soldiers tend to regard it, war provides also an opportunity for the virtue of facing disagreeable facts. As living in the open is good, although some practise it only to cure disease, so in war and its institutions many good things are discovered, which could be found elsewhere, but are in fact known to the majority only in war.

War as an institution—the organisation of armed forces, spying, and the use of science for destruction—is based upon certain psychological forces operative in contemporary society. These forces, therefore, should be examined first. The question is—What mental attitudes or impulses, commonly shared, lead to the making of warships and the drilling of young men in order to make them more efficient in killing other young men? Behind an ancient institution lie many different psychological forces; but war continues to be possible to-day not

because of primitive passions but because of certain dominant current beliefs. Men do not use machine-guns chiefly because they have a repressed hate for their parents—as some psychologists think, but because they believe in a mythology of national “honour” or “defence.” Among savages some believe that it is desirable to wear a ring in the nose, and others believe that it is inevitable, because so many of their neighbours do it. The dominant attitude leads everyone to support the making and wearing of nose-rings, although clearly many other simpler “complexes” support the endurance of the incidental pain. The desire for friendship, the fear of being thought a coward, the maintenance of tradition all support the wearing of nose-rings, in some communities. So also primitive impulses and the revolt against repression do indeed support the tendency to war. But the chief force making for war is the dominant belief in all nations about other nations. That is why all nations are preparing for another war. What, then, do we believe?

### *Ancient Beliefs*

Very few in any nation now believe that armed force should be used to capture women, or cattle, gold or other loot. After actual battles the practice survives of collecting trophies—the helmets of the dead, shell-cases and other débris. Collecting scalps, however, is not in fashion, and in any case



no one believes that such booty as can be taken, even as a "prize" in naval war, is the purpose of war. A few Kurdish tribes may still believe what all our ancestors once believed, but most of us now are sadder and wiser. Even "glory," as a purpose of war, is now faded. Some dictators still seem to believe in it, and there is a sort of schoolboy and schoolgirl belief that holding your head high and walking in step—which is clearly "glorious"—is war. But it would be difficult for a politician, even if he is a "leader" immune from criticism, to persuade any nation to go to war for "glory." Napoleon and the other earlier brigands who sought glory in the slaughter of common soldiers would not now be able to raise an army. "Glory" is still sought by a few "old boys" on battlefields, as Clausewitz showed, when a war has actually begun, and flags which are discarded in action, do very well for "glory" afterwards. But no one would explain his willingness to go to war as a desire for "glory."

A modern version of "glory," however, is "national honour", and that is still believed in. It is a sort of shared "glory" in refusing to argue one's case. Thus sticking for honour is a public-house or beer-garden virtue—the gallantry of somewhat intoxicated quarrellers. Squaring-up to the foreigner for the sake of "national honour" is intelligible to the meanest intelligence—but hardly to any other. However, every nation is made up of many different types, and public policy is some-

times influenced by the quarrelsome type. They are good fellows, not your long-haired cranks who prate about peace! But they can hardly expect the majority to go to war for "honour" at this time of day.

Another and more tangible reason for war is "national interest." This is believed in by all "practical men," who are practical because they judge any policy by asking what they can "make" out of it. "National interest" may be a piece of territory, as in the case of strategic frontiers, or a kind of trade, as in the case of gold-mining in the Transvaal. "National" is a word which covers a multitude of obscurities. The "national income" for example in economic treatises is the addition of all the incomes of any population in an area, without reference to the fact that some have thousands of pounds and others only a few pence. It may be an interest of some few that this national income should be maintained, but it is mysterious that the others should believe it to be their interest. It may be an advantage to some in a nation that war should occur, but they have to persuade the rest that the whole nation will gain. However, the "national interest" in the economic sense is not openly confessed to be the chief purpose of any war. No leader would urge us to go to war on the ground that it actually "pays." At most it is disappointing if victory cannot be made to pay. And even when completely successful, a war nowadays is regarded as so regrettable that other people are

blamed for starting it. The "War Guilt" clause in the Versailles Treaty has brought out the general feeling on both sides of the controversy, that no one wants any credit for starting a war.

### *The Defence Complex*

Not honour nor interest themselves, but the *defence* of such things is most commonly believed to be the reason for war and for preparations to wage it again as soon as any war ends. A belief in defence is at the very centre of the modern conception of war. War Departments are modestly disguised as "Defence" Departments, and the Estimates for preparing for war are the cost of "Defence." War heroes have become our gallant defenders. Everyone believes in defence. In Germany "krieg" meaning "war," which is associated with "kriegen," to seize or loot, is now replaced by "wehr," meaning "defence." In France "la guerre" is what foreigners do, and "la défense nationale" is the habit of Frenchmen. Who indeed could refuse to "defend" his country? Who would leave it defenceless? The belief that defence is necessary for each nation against any other—this is the chief psychological source of war. The problem for us here is why battle-ships and tanks and bombing aeroplanes are believed to be necessary only for defence. Clearly it would not be a problem, if one nation alone believed it. If all the other nations kept such

things for attack or unprovoked aggression, it would be reasonable to suppose that "our" armaments were only for defence. But there is no nation whatever that is armed for any other purpose than defence. Not one of them, in its own opinion, is aggressive, for if it is "driven to attack," it is even then only defending its rights. But why then choose battleships and tanks? Clearly it is not because of shovels and spades over the frontier, for we should not need battleships and tanks to defend ourselves against these. No, we need battleships to defend us against battleships—which is precisely why the other fellow needs battleships too. The problem "why defence?" is therefore made still more difficult because all the instruments of defence are directed against instruments of defence. If the other fellow did not defend himself with battleships, "we" should not need any, whoever "we" are. And still another difficulty arises. The majority of States, which are not Great Powers, have no battleships and altogether inadequate tanks. They lack such "defences." But since none of their neighbours, the Great Powers, would do anything but defend themselves, the small States should need no defence. And yet and yet to have to submit the national honour and interest to mere argument, to be unable to rely upon enforcing one's own view of one's interest by arms, that would be to be a "second class" nation, not equal in status, as all Sovereign States should be! The Great Powers do not copy

the defencelessness of small States, and small States would defend themselves exactly as Great Powers do, if they could. The belief in the need for defence is as irrational as the belief in witches, but it still survives.

### *Origin of the Complex*

No reasonable explanation can be given of defence by war. The belief that war is for defence is a belief in mythology. It is a picturesque excuse for the maintenance of old habits which would be supported by some other excuse, if "defence" did not sound right. The problem for us here, then, is why the *belief* survives that war is for defence.

The psychological source of the belief is probably as follows. The world we inhabit is normally imagined to spread outward from each of us, who are obviously civilised, to a shadowy region where men do not live as we do. These others are outsiders or foreigners. For very simple societies the foreigners are in the next village, but a little travel or trade shows that, although the next village is not quite like "home," its inhabitants are not altogether savage. They do not have tails, as mediæval Italians believed the men of Kent had. And now there are quite large areas outside one's own home-town, and within one's "nation," where most men expect to be treated reasonably. But always civilisation is envisaged as having a centre where "we" live and a shadowy circumfer-

ence It is a fact that civilization has arisen and spread, from certain centres, outwards In very early times each centre was surrounded by a no-man's land where the ploughed fields ended and the writ of the law did not run In that no-man's land lived outlaws or enemies of society, not easily distinguishable from the wild beasts with whom one cannot argue a case, against whom, therefore, one must use force Only the bravest would go to that frontier of civilisation But from that area came all sorts of dangers—marauding bands or possible conquerors, and naturally *defence* was the normal reaction when one looked to the frontier In each centre of civilisation men looked outward in the same way, and each centre seemed to need defence against surrounding barbarism At first the city was defended by its trained bands against local lords or the village defended by its own lord against a neighbouring lord, and then larger areas were formed by alliance or conquest or accident, so that the circle within which civilised life was imagined to exist embraced many millions These were "nations" Each in time had a capital, and each had a frontier Each, therefore, preserved from earlier times the dominant attitude towards its frontier, as a limit to civilised life At the frontier only defence was necessary—defence against what lay outside the law The brave ventured beyond the frontier or stood at the frontier to ward off the dangers of the unknown What lay beyond was naturally believed to be

untrustworthy The imagination lives upon memory, and so it has preserved the old sense of the frontier

But in fact the situation has radically changed The circle surrounding each centre of civilisation has gradually expanded and now, at their frontiers, all States touch There is no longer a no-man's land, dividing civilised countries Not even the English Channel or the Atlantic is a no-man's land, for no pirates or outlaws are there Even the high seas are under the law The law runs everywhere, but not the same law One law ends where the other begins And yet, in defiance of the facts, each group that lives under one law still imagines the limits of its own law to be the beginning of barbarism The imagination of men to-day, therefore, perpetuates the domination over public policy of a situation long since vanished

Frenchmen treat Germans as if they were the marauders and possible conquerors of early times, and Germans treat Frenchmen in the same way Englishmen regard Japanese or any other persons with sufficient battleships as mediæval townfolk regarded the outlaws or barons outside their borders, and the Japanese return the compliment And the proof in each nation that outside its borders live only barbarians is precisely that armament which each believes in its own case is a defence of civilisation! The armaments of each nation arise from the belief, but the belief is "proved" to be valid for each nation by the exist-

ence of the other nation's armaments. It seems impossible for most men to make the effort of imagination required to grasp the fact that civilisation has many centres and that the circumferences of the circles now touch—that therefore the trader or traveller passes from one form of civilisation into another, not into barbarism. It is difficult to grasp that anyone talking unintelligibly is talking sense, and a foreigner seems to be like an animal in not understanding what one says. It is difficult to imagine that anyone who looks very different from one's friends is really civilised. All these sources of suspicion reinforce the atavism of the "defence" complex in the majority of men, and since this majority never thinks of foreigners at all in normal times, it is the more inclined to dislike them when attention is forcibly called to them.

### *Proofs of Danger*

But defence is perhaps really needed still. The type of person who risked adventure in the no-man's land of earlier times still exists. The brave explorer or the big-game hunter lies hidden in many a clerk or cattle-merchant. Thousands of women love the warrior who returns with some blood upon him. In each centre of civilisation these few are much more excited about the frontier than most others are. They are impatient at a world without beasts to kill or distressed damsels to be rescued. But foreigners will do instead



of wolves and bears, and all foreigners are supposed by heroes to be keen on destroying "our" homes and violating "our" virgins. Thus in each nation there are some who in fact, and not merely in mistaken belief, are a danger to other nations. And in each nation these few can be pointed to by similar people in neighbouring nations, as a proof that defence is necessary. It is our gallant defenders who are our chief danger! If they did not frighten the foreigners, these foolish foreigners would not try to frighten us. The Navy Leagues of the world belong to the long-since vanished world of gallant adventure in a no-man's land, but they make the otherwise unreasonable belief in the need for defence represent some facts. The belief is supported also by the habit of looking at one's own armaments only from behind and at the other nation's armaments only from in front. A gun always looks defensive from one end, and offensive from the other end, which the foreigners see. Thus the French can believe that their bombing-aircraft is only for defence, but it seems offensive to Germans. Even the British navy looks different from in front! One psychological source of the belief that it is only for defence is the inability to see it from the other point of view. War and preparation for war are maintained by this defect.

But wars nowadays are the wars of nations. How did the defence complex become associated with the "nation"? It was clearly the small face-to-

face communities of early times that first felt the need of defence. Only those who knew one another personally were within the defences. The defence of any small community, however, is improved by alliance with others and by the use of specialists in the game. The warrior caste assisted in the formation of more inclusive alliances, for a larger number of subjects in fact. And so "king and country" came to be associated. During some stages of development the king is the country. "France," for example, was once the name of a person, not of a people, as "Warwick" may mean the Earl of Warwick, or "Burgundy" the Duke of Burgundy. Thus the primitive and feudal conception of service due to a person is confused with the slightly more developed conception of service of a community. The Crown is vaguely identified with the Commonwealth. And all the simple emotions and unstable thinking at this stage of social development is carried on from parents to children, from teacher to pupil, in ballads and in fairy-stories, doing duty as "history." The spread of the "defence" complex, until it is associated with large units now called "nations," is also due to the need of most men for a wider community than normal life provides. Even to-day war takes the clerk from his desk, the engineer from his lathe, the woman in a textile mill from the daily contact with some other women who live in the same street. War provides the opportunity to mix with new people in a more important common task. But normally

the "spread" of one's association with others is possible only up to the limits of one's language-area. At the end of the Middle Ages in Europe the "educated" few, united by a common Latin speech, were pulled asunder by the growth of local languages out of local dialects and of local laws out of local customs. Thought and emotion took root in several different centres, and they combined with the amalgamation of units for defence under kings. The result was the Nation—larger than the face-to-face community of town or village, but limited by the frontier of any one speech. The "country" came to take the first place, and the king, the second. So now—"Your country needs you" is said in war—but not in peace. "La Patrie" is worth dying for, but not worth paying taxes for. A succession of very different historical influences—the increase of population, the concentration of industry, the character of transport—worked in with the original fear of foreigners and the slightly later desire for help from allies and associates, to fix the "defence" complex upon the nation. And there we now stand.

The nation as something to be defended, however, is still conceived in primitive terms. It is never the whole company of manual workers and poor folk who are in fact the great majority in any nation. It is "the Powers that Be." It is the traditional Established Order. And because rule is still conceived by many as a form of possession—almost a control of property—the nation is

easily imagined to include its so-called "possessions" These must be "defended," therefore, as part of the nation, and more fiercely defended in proportion as it is subconsciously felt that they are really not "the nation" at all Thus "the Empire" is the unit with a frontier at which barbarism is supposed to begin, either in Great Britain or in France or even in the Dutch East Indies Peace has an adjective it is "pax Britannica" or "Romana," not peace for everyone The "defence" complex can apparently be attached to anything associated, however vaguely, with the home-town Symbols assist the transference Flags are most powerful, and next, songs are useful, but new forms of ritual can be invented, in order to spread or change the current feeling about what is to be defended and where the danger comes from Saluting the flag is recent, but not so recent as wearing a coloured shirt By suitable means any "we" can be made to feel the joy in "getting together" against some monster somewhere The "defence" complex remains powerful, because it is always easier to unite men and women *against* something than in favour of anything

A still more hidden source of the "defence" complex is to be found in the social structure of most contemporary nations War is partly a result of the psychological situation arising out of the relations between the members of a community which is "feudal"—which is divided into an "upper" and "lower" class War is natural to

that form of caste society which survives in the social standards of feudalism, even where political democracy is accepted. In such a society primitive appetites and attitudes survive strongly among the few members of a leisured class which lives on its nerves, but from these few the same appetites and attitudes may be spread to a whole people, when the government is in difficulties or trade is reduced or food becomes expensive. The passion for war spreads like a flame in the dry brushwood of an imagination which preserves the memories of a distant past. Perhaps unconsciously, war and the preparation for war are felt to involve discipline for the many, which is incidentally a defence of the richer few in an upper class. Thus the belief in "defence" of a caste, as well as of a nation—vague in most men and violent in a few—is one of the sources of the tendency to war.

A calm analysis, however, of the original grounds for a psychological complex obviously does not indicate its present force as a principle of action. We must allow, therefore, for the fact that the belief in war as defence becomes more passionate, as the grounds for that belief become weaker. All blind faith is stronger in proportion as the original reasons for the faith are forgotten. Emotion floods in to fill the empty spaces left by retreating reason. And so belief in war becomes a sort of mental and physical exaltation or ecstasy, as in Mussolini's creed, in his own words:

“War alone carries all human energies to the maximum of tension and sets the seal of nobility on the peoples who have the courage to face it”<sup>1</sup>

This form of ecstasy appears in a philosophical form in the work of Hegel, and in a more literary form in the work of Carlyle. The more popular versions of the same faith can be found in certain newspapers in all countries, and in the “manliness” of such politicians as Theodore Roosevelt, who said, in June 1897

“No national life is worth having if the nation is not willing, when the need shall arise, to stake everything on the supreme arbitrament of war and to pour out its blood, its treasure and tears like water rather than submit to the loss of honour and renown”

Similarly William II Hohenzollern and other persons in key-positions have been able to affect the relations between peoples by infusing an ecstasy of primitive mentality into the situation. War in some cases is not a mass-phenomenon or a problem of social psychology but only the effect of the emotions of primitive individuals who have control of the relation between Governments.

Thus the “defence” complex, which is the chief psychological source of war and the preparation for new war, includes primitive fears and suspicions, primitive reactions to the unknown, some very reasonable observations of the bellicose few on the

<sup>1</sup> *Fascism in the Dict. Diplomatique*, 1933. Translated as *Doctrine of Fascism* (Hogarth Press, 1933)

other side of one's frontiers and an ecstasy of emotion. This complex is preserved and made more powerful by the institutions of war and by the practice of foreign policy. It is played upon by newspapers seeking to provide excitement in a dull world. It is promoted by the traditional education, especially in history. The meaning of "defence" is not asked, nor given. It is an assumption about vaguely conceived "possible enemies." And the majority in each nation continue to believe quite seriously that they alone are honest in pleading that their armaments are only for defence.

### *Psychology of Battle*

The psychological sources of war as an institution, however, should be distinguished from the psychological satisfactions in battle, when it actually occurs. There is then a mob-passion of excitement and a general sense of importance, which makes the ordinary person feel less obscure than in his normal life. The relatives of a "hero" share his glory. The idealism of the son makes the father who stays at home, feel idealistic. Politicians become "saviours of the country", opposition is silenced and criticism in abeyance—for a time. Best of all, thousands of men and women have the satisfaction in war-time of feeling that they serve a common good. Great numbers enjoy being ordered about and having no responsibility for deciding what they ought to do; and the orders

are willingly supplied by others, only too eager to be minor and, if possible, major dictators. But all these tendencies and satisfactions could not be found in battle, unless war as an institution had been maintained for years before by the primitive attitude towards the frontier.

Battle is desired by some men also because peace for them lacks excitement. This is the very general principle which includes all those reasons for war given by some psychologists, such as sexual repression and the instinct of pugnacity. Civilised life is "unnatural," in the sense that it is new. It is quite in accordance with "nature" that men should drive motors and fly in aeroplanes, because it is human nature not to remain satisfied with what has usually been done. But only in recent times have we used internal combustion engines, and even going to an office or a factory regularly every day is a recently acquired habit, which is irksome to many. The normal intercourse between men and women to-day is formal, and a "rape of the Sabines" would astonish even Piccadilly. All civilised life involves the repression of some impulses for the development of others. But at certain times great numbers of men and women, especially in the city-areas, become irritable and excitable because of the repressions which are incidental to civilised life. Some such men adopt quasi-military uniforms and feel much more important in disguise than they would as clerks and porters. In such circles and at such times war and



the rumour of war promise relief. If there is no other relief, the danger of war is increased. In this very general sense, the psychological barrenness of peace is one of the sources of war.

No doubt there are some who had their sexual impulses too much repressed in their early years. No doubt some have not the sexual relationships they need. And a certain bitterness or irritability may be the result, which would find relief in war. But these people would be equally well served by riot or revolution or even drunkenness and shouting. It is an accident that war supplies their relief. The repressed sexual complex as an explanation of war, therefore, may serve to explain how some recruits are attracted, but not why machine-guns are made. Similarly, there are indeed some who enjoy cruelty—some are cruel to others—sadists, and some to themselves—masochists. But even the Marquis de Sade and Sacher-Masoch were not as bad as they tried to appear in their writings, and the number of such persons or the amount of such tendencies in most persons is not enough to cause war. Sadism and Masochism and "*la nostalgie de la boue*" will support any tendency to war, but they also support, as history has shown, all kinds of other social diseases—prostitution, drug-taking and reckless gambling. In any case, these abnormalities do not explain the undoubted idealism and gallantry of most soldiers. The armies and navies and aircraft in war are manned by some of the noblest of our youths. Blind they may be,

but not themselves diseased or abnormal. The vast majority of them are by no means sadists nor masochists, nor do they suffer from sexual repressions. But if the political situation, maintained by the obsolete belief in "defence," leads to war, all these abnormalities come into play and support the actual excitement of battle.

The instinct of pugnacity is another explanation of war, suggested by some psychologists. But it is inadequate as an explanation. If the phrase means only the tendency to fight, then the tendency to go to war is indeed an explanation of war, but it is a mediæval kind of explanation! The instinct of pugnacity, if there is any such thing, may support a man in a bayonet charge, but it does not find much satisfaction in a trench where war compels one to wait for many days, hoping for something to happen. Those psychologists who rely upon sex-repression and pugnacity are perhaps thinking of mediæval combats, not of modern war. The disease which affects national policy, causes the discovery of poison-gas and drills youths for many years, is deeply rooted in the whole institutional structure of society. Psychologically it is maintained chiefly by a defect of the imagination with respect to those who live outside one's own frontiers, which is embodied in the "defence" complex. But the survival of that complex is greatly assisted by the institutions which must now be discussed.

## CHAPTER II

### WAR AS AN INSTITUTION

WAR is a very ancient institution—older than slavery, older than kingship, older than any of the religions now in existence. War has its mysteries, its rituals, its code of manners, its sacred symbols, and the very weight of all this, embodied in the preparations for future war to-day, would be enough to make war still possible, even if a larger number of men and women were able to escape from the inherited psychological complex which induces them to support preparations for war. The organisation necessary for waging war reinforces the primitive tendencies leading to war and in some cases excites primitive appetites which are dormant. Thus navies and armies and aircraft for war increase the danger of war, not only, as it was suggested above, by providing excuses for each nation to defend itself against the other's defences, but also through the influence, within each nation, of those who organise the preparations for war. Those who live by organising society for war, consciously or unconsciously, increase the importance of what they do. They have an influence over public policy, social custom, education and the emotion of crowds, and obviously if war were

less likely, their position would be less important. If war were impossible, they would be as useless as witch-doctors, and all their Treatises on the Art of War would be as obsolete as the old theological volumes on witchcraft and demonic possession.

### *Influence on Social Customs*

The institution called war now involves complicated social organisation for direction, command and discipline. There are other systems of organisation, such as that of industrial production, but war requires a much more complete authority above and a much greater submission below. For war, command must be definite and immune from criticism, and obedience must be absolute, so that the subordinate becomes only a passive instrument of a plan not his own. Service in aircraft and in some forms of trench-warfare may require more individual judgment from the fighting man, but the dominant tone or colour of the institution called war is that of complete subordination to superiors. This indeed is the reason given by those ignorant of modern education for promoting discipline by preparing youths to serve in war. Primitive minds do not understand any discipline but that of the barracks or the battlefield. But even such discipline is enjoyable to some. It is enjoyed chiefly by those in control of it, who are loud in their praise of the virtue of obedience for all those whom they command. And even the

rank and file may acquire a certain pride in precise movements of groups of men under orders. This is combined with traditional or manufactured admiration for the "heroic" virtues of primitive times and for the risks involved in using violence. The mental attitude which is the result is called militarism.

### *Militarism*

This attitude in some countries spreads far outside the armed forces into the whole of the community. In some cases, it is consciously developed by the educational system, under control of the government, as in Italy under the Fascists and in Germany under the Nazis. By means of praise for primitive heroes and "national" victories in the teaching of history, by military drill and the separation of the youth from contacts with other nations, the whole community is prepared for war. It is said quite seriously by the militarists who support this policy that they love nothing better than "peace." They are preparing only "the spirit of defence," in German called "wehrgeist." But, as it has been shown in the first chapter, this is only the atavistic complex which excuses all forms of war in modern times. A nation trained in that attitude towards its neighbours is a danger to peace, whatever the professions of its spokesmen may be. Militarism is the attitude in a whole nation which depends upon the admiration for primitive virtues, the

primitive forms of discipline and the belief that one's chief service to the community, in its relation with foreigners, is to defend the community against them. This attitude appears to be dominant in certain, otherwise civilised, nations to-day, but it is supported by the fact that the institutions of war exist in all nations.

Even in countries where no positive admiration for primitive heroes and mechanised discipline is developed by the educational system, conscription, that is to say, compulsory military service for male adults, spreads the influence of war as an institution into the whole social structure. The separation of the sexes involved in barrack life for soldiers, prostitution and venereal disease as a consequence, and the removal of so much human energy from productive employment in the most vigorous years of life, inevitably affect the whole community. War becomes the familiar background of life for large numbers, and preparation for it seems to be the chief service of the country. The usual excuses are found. Conscription of the whole male population is said to be "democratic," in countries which are not "democratic" enough to give the franchise to women and a "citizen" army is said to be a defence against the "pretorians" who would arise if service was voluntary. It happens also to be convenient to some interests that under conscription, strikes can be broken when the Government calls conscripts to the colours. The preparations for war serve many other uses! And

clearly some elements of militarism enter into all preparations for war, even if the militarism involved is not conscious or openly proclaimed. French writers on the Art of War distinguish the warlike spirit from the military spirit and praise the latter. Evidently the social effect within a nation of a general training in obedience to an authority immune from criticism is very convenient.

Militarism is a characteristic of all well-organised armed forces. It is not altogether objectionable, for it usually includes a sense of community, which unites the officer and his men. It involves a pride in the symbols of that community—the uniform, the flag, badges of rank and medals, and it is not altogether bad that the soldier should give immediate and undoubting obedience to any command from his authorised superior. Also militarism is often connected with the admiration for a “hard” life and difficult tasks. The soft and sensual æsthete is not so good a man as the soldier on duty. War provides an opportunity for all these forms of virtue, and the institution is preserved, at least partly, because of the moral good derived from it.

But looked at more closely, the very need for complete subordination of some to others in war, proves that the institution is primitive. There are many in any community who lack “personality,” who chafe at the neglect which their own deficiencies cause, and such persons can acquire a “sense of importance” in war and in preparation for war.

A warlike uniform will make the most insignificant of us feel like a hero, and traditionally we assume that, so disguised, we shall be treated as heroes. Officers have an even better chance of feeling important, and there are few such chances in the ordinary life of peace. Many clerks and dock-labourers felt important in the Great War, who are now chafing at the obscurity and insignificance of their present positions. Ex-sergeants and ex-officers lack someone to command, and even women who, as nurses or munition-workers, felt that they were "in a big thing," are now perhaps subconsciously restless, as typists or textile workers. The sense of importance which can be satisfied in war-service attracts many to war.

In peace-time, the armed forces provide for some men the same satisfaction. The soldier is well aware that he is regarded as a defender of his country. The officer class, when it is strongly entrenched in a richer stratum of the community, is a great reservoir of self-importance, and admirals and generals hardly endure the views of politicians upon "the interests of the country." Quite seriously a good admiral or general will believe that he is an authority upon what number of ships or tanks "the nation needs." That such things are instruments of policy, he will indeed admit, but he believes that he is the best judge of what policy ought to be. And in most countries his influence is so great among the governing circle or clique that he can actually make policy what he thinks



it ought to be. It would be unjust to suppose that he sees how his own position would be shaken, if there were fewer warships or tanks. It is the sense of his own importance rather than the desire for more power which usually controls his action. The admiral or general, saving the nation from its elected representatives or saving it from itself, is in a sort of ecstasy. He is rapt into a third heaven, in which criticism of his competence becomes blasphemy. The Japanese have recently shown the world the sublimest form of this result of the war system, but we had an example in our own country in the incident at the Curragh in Ireland before the Great War. France has had difficulties with her Napoleons and her anti-Dreyfusards, but has always overcome them in the end. Germany has hardly ever escaped tutelage to her generals. Every country has the generals and admirals it deserves. And in all countries the institutions of war inevitably increase the influence of those who understand the use of organised violence and not the use of persuasion.

### *The Officer Class*

The officer class and well-disciplined armed forces produce in any community the disdain for ordinary occupations of trade and industry, which is another feature of militarism. The superior air of "the services" is partly due to a very correct feeling that to do your work merely for the sake

of what you can make out of it, is ignoble. If war-service is the only way in which a person can serve his community, then trade and industry are indeed less worthy of honour than soldiering. But in the first place, not long ago soldiering itself was only a trade: adventurers took service for pay or loot, as they still do in out-of-the-way parts of the world. And secondly, the superior air of the warrior is partly due, not to his devotion to the common good but to the traditional dislike of the "gentleman" and his servants for anything so civilised as creative labour. We inherit all the prejudices of slave-civilisations, in which agricultural and industrial work was done by those who were not "free." The prejudice against such work is preserved in the superior air of the members of armies and navies. Even in the navy itself, the navigating officer does not really believe that an engineer officer can be his equal. The disdain of the occupations of peace is an atavism, preserved in modern communities by the institutions of war.

The officer class is necessarily a gentleman class—that is to say, an upper class not only with regard to civilians who have to work for a living, but also with regard to the rank and file who are often called "their men." There are many excellent qualities in a gentleman, but war as an institution promotes the bad as well as the good qualities in the officer class. Thus the Officers' Training Corps, in the schools, not of the majority of the citizens of England, but of a select minority, pro-

motes the superior airs of those who are prepared to command "their men" in war. Many critics of the O.T.C.'s believe that they promote militarism and the desire for war, but even if that is not so, they are certainly means for promoting the division between social classes. They are methods of training some to exercise command over others, who are assumed only to be obedient. If these two functions are divided between social classes, we are in a slave civilisation.

All war and preparation for war is convenient for the maintenance of an "upper class" in a community, because of the discipline and command requisite for war. Some nations, for example the French and the Americans, have done their best to maintain an equalitarian atmosphere even in their armed forces, but it is almost impossible. No position in civil life gives so securely an "upper class" status as the position of an officer in the armed forces. Since the Middle Ages and the career of arms in the eighteenth century, an officer has traditionally belonged to a superior stratum in society. Royalties wear the uniforms of officers in the armed forces, and the "best society" attends military weddings and funerals. Thus the possibility of war and therefore the preparation for it preserve the division of the community into "upper" and "lower" classes, and perpetuate mediæval feudalism, flunkeyism and snobbery. A well-disciplined rank and file and an officer class—even in a militarised police—are the best

bulwarks of inherited privilege War, therefore, has many incidental uses, which are not its ostensible purpose No doubt the preparations for war are for the sake of defence, but not only against foreign enemies<sup>1</sup> They are also defences against the equalitarian tendencies of modern times

### *Influence on Public Policy*

The influence of the institutions of war upon political organisation and public policy is even more direct than their influence upon social customs and standards At the head of all armed forces in all countries, there is a concentration of influence in War Departments, always playing upon public affairs So long as each nation is determined to "defend" itself by force of arms, so long will the General Staff, or the equivalent in England, the Committee of Imperial Defence, have the final decision in all crises of foreign policy If war is possible, the final control over diplomacy lies with those responsible for achieving success in war, and they naturally exert some influence at all times, behind the scenes Thus the modern State may increase its services for education and health or promote trade, but it remains fundamentally a robber-band under its chieftains, so long as any of its interests or its rights depend upon its own power to maintain them by armed force Diplomacy, as it will be shown later, still holds in reserve the threat of war as an instrument of the

policy it promotes, and therefore those responsible for the efficacy of the threat, the organisers of armed force, must be consulted on all important international issues. Besides, the General Staff of each country knows best what the General Staffs of the other countries are doing and what power they control. Each General Staff, therefore, so long as the ultimate relationship of States is violence, must decide whether the threat of force can be made effectual, and politicians must bow to their opinion.

### *Influence on Science and Industry*

Modern war requires not only General Staffs and War Departments and disciplined men and manœuvres and war supplies, but also a continual search for new instruments of destruction. It is essential to any hope of victory in war that one should be superior to one's possible opponents, in the application of science and industrial technique to the requirements of war. Therefore there is never any hesitation among the organisers of war to spend generously on research for war. All the great nations spend large sums for supporting young scientists in the attempt to discover new poison-gas, new explosives and more destructive weapons. Modern war has attained its great efficacy for destruction by the use of good young brains in devising new means of slaughter, and it is hardly to be imagined that, in the world as it is, those

very brains could have been devoted to the cure of disease, to the improvement of education or industry or even—an absurd idea—to the promotion of peace! War as an institution turns to destruction some of our ablest young scientists, and no word of protest or mildest criticism comes from the great Scientific Societies of the civilised world

The invention of new methods of destruction is now promoted by each Government, as far as possible, in secret. Before the Great War the private traders in armaments used to discover better weapons and sell them to the highest bidder, and thus had the advantage or, from the point of view of strategy, the disadvantage that most General Staffs knew, before war broke out, what kind of armaments it would have to face on the other side. Now, however, the invention of weapons has been "cornered" by Governments, and as a result, no General Staff can be quite as certain as before how the enemy in a new war will be armed. Thus the preparations for war have made war more likely, because when a man is afraid of the unknown, he prefers to deliver his blow first. Each General Staff becomes more nervous, as secret inventions available for the others become more numerous, and each General Staff therefore tends to be more urgent in its advice to the politicians in control of Governments to deliver the first blow when a crisis arises.

*War promotes Treachery*

The very advance in the application of science to war and the need for secrecy, if the new weapons are to be effectual, have caused a wide extension of the system of spying. This is part of the institution of war. In plain terms, each great State pays some of the citizens of other States to betray their country's secrets. Some disapproval is felt for the spies, but none apparently for those who pay them. It is part of our "defence" that our money should be used to corrupt the loyalty of the citizens of foreign States, and obviously other States are doing the same to us. This system is used even between members of the League of Nations. Each Government promotes treachery to the others. Occasionally in the newspapers some rumour appears about spies abroad or at home. If war occurs, the popular suspicion fastens upon all kinds of innocent persons who are supposed to be spies. But the important spies are not common folk in the streets, and normally, in times of peace, the gentleman-spy is more useful. The polite spying of military and naval attachés, at legations, is generally recognised. Engineers abroad can be useful to their own Governments, and there have been instances of persons who were spies for several Governments at the same time, providing impartially the secret information desired, even when the Governments which paid them were at war, one with the other.

Spying is one institution among others, essential to war. The manual of military law says "It is lawful to employ spies and secret agents and even to gain over by bribery or other means enemy soldiers or private enemy subjects. Yet the fact that these methods are lawful does not prevent the punishment, under certain conditions, of the individuals who are engaged in procuring intelligence in other than an open manner as combatants. Custom admits their punishment by death, although a more lenient penalty may be inflicted." That is to say, it is permissible to induce some to commit a crime for which they are punished by those who are permitted to induce others to commit the same crime! War, in this aspect of the institution, is obviously immoral, but the laws of war secure that the immorality involved in inducing treachery by bribes shall be polite. Spying, however, is not the only aspect of war which is regulated by a code of good manners.

### *The Laws of War*

War as an institution has developed under the influence of improving social standards. Chivalry, for example, affected the barbarous knights of the Middle Ages, and at a later date the ideal of the "gentleman" at courts affected the "profession of arms," which was recognised as suitable for a superior social class. The weapons of war, however, became more destructive, while the standards



of conduct in normal life were becoming more humane, and from the later Middle Ages, the two tendencies showed themselves in opposition, wherever the chivalrous or gentlemanly warrior expressed his horror at new weapons such as the cross-bow, the musket or the rifle. From very early times the slaughter of the wounded and vanquished had been mitigated by the institution of slavery, for it "paid" the victors to capture rather than kill those on the losing side. But slavery died out in Europe. Religious differences became more passionate at the end of the Middle Ages, and the killing of those vanquished in war became more usual again. A new effort, largely influenced by the writers on International Law, was therefore made, to oppose promiscuous slaughter, and the more civilised conditions of normal life began to moderate some of the habits of warriors. Finally in the later nineteenth century, the humaner treatment of common folk and the distaste for the torture and public execution of criminals affected even war, and new regulations were accepted by warriors with respect to the treatment of non-combatants, the wounded and prisoners of war. Some restrictions were also placed upon the use of force and fraud in war. These expressions of a moral standard are all now embodied in the so-called Laws of War.

War as an institution, therefore, now involves some slight control by the social standards of civilised life over its essential brutalities. All the

chief States issue manuals of military law and customs in order to guide their officers as to "what no fellow can do" What should *not* be done in war is what has happened to seem objectionable to our grandfathers, but it is lucky for us that they advanced even so far as they did What *should* be done is still the torture and slaughter of men, and certain forms of deceit and bribery But the morality of civilised life limits the practices of war in three chief aspects (1) the treatment of non-combatants, (2) the treatment of wounded and captured soldiers, and (3) the avoidance of certain weapons and certain methods of slaughter

Members of armed forces, as the military manuals say, "may be killed or injured as long as they continue to resist" "Resist" is a good word! What is meant is that you may kill anyone who is trying to kill you "Peaceful inhabitants on the other hand," says the manuals, "may not be killed or wounded" This old privilege of non-combatants is now insecure, because (1) munition-makers can hardly be called non-combatants, for modern war is industrial, and (2) bombs from aircraft will certainly be used, if war occurs, against "open" towns and civilian populations The wounded are protected by the Red Cross, under the Geneva Convention of 1864, restated in the Convention of 1906 Under this Convention wounded members of the armed forces must be "respected and taken care of", but there is "no obligation to tend other persons, not officially

attached to armies, who may have been wounded by chance" "The dead must be protected against pillage and maltreatment" and further details express the limits beyond which European and other "civilised" nations have agreed not to go

As for weapons, explosive bullets were agreed to be objectionable, under the Declaration of St Petersburg of 1868, but the earlier attempts to prevent the introduction of the cross-bow, the bayonet, the rifle and the torpedo have all failed<sup>1</sup> At present attempts are being made to prevent the use of chemical poisons already "abolished" by some Conventions since the Great War, which poisons are now being prepared for use by the Governments of the Great Powers, although they have agreed not to use what they are preparing<sup>1</sup> In 1899 at the Hague Peace Conference the Russian proposal to prevent the use of chemical poisons was opposed by the British delegate on the ground that it was not likely that chemistry could provide effectual poisons for use in war, and on 22nd April, 1915, the German armies used these poisons for the first time All the chief Governments have agreed not to use bacteria for war, and no methods of so using them have yet been discovered

War, therefore, is an elaborate and partially regulated system of official violence A large part of International Law has always been concerned with the accepted regulations of war, and some

<sup>1</sup> See C. Delisle Burns, *Morality of Nations*, 1915

writers on International Law have searched for subtle reasons to excuse whatever is done by any State. The most immoral of all reasons is that "the State" is above morality, and that, therefore, whatever is done in the name of the State is rightly done. But all jurists admit that there should be in practice some limits to barbarism. Thus, when war begins, each side knows what kind of slaughter and torture is most likely to be used against it, and each side limits its own methods, upon a general understanding that "the rules" will be kept. This has the effect of making war seem to be a sort of game, played under rules, but the rules allow the use of most of the improvements in the methods of killing and other destruction, promoted by science. They are conveniently elastic.

Some believe that the more horrible war becomes, the less likely it will be, and they propose therefore not to increase the restrictions on the methods of war by prohibition of new kinds of weapons. But this argument misinterprets both psychology and the theory of morals. Psychologically one can become accustomed to any horror, and morally the only way by which civilised conduct spreads over minds still subject to barbarous impulse is the formation of habit. The longer men are able to avoid cruelty, the less likely they are to find excuses for it, and the greater the number of acts they perceive to be cruel, the most sensitive they become to the essential and inevitable brutality of any form of

war Therefore all limitations of force and fraud in war are desirable, as inhibitions of primitive impulse, and the more effectual the agreements not to use certain weapons, the sooner war itself will become obsolete When the passions of mobs are aroused in modern war or when hand-to-hand fighting makes the troops engaged peculiarly savage, any agreements to limit force may break down But the longer men can retain their civilised distaste for killing other men, the more likely it will be that any war will end without extreme bitterness on both sides Stories of atrocities on either side always cause a savagery in the making of peace, and actual cruelty is seldom forgotten

As an institution, therefore, war is the organisation of a community or part of a community for the most effectual use of violence against other communities similarly organised This organisation requires that some in each community should be in positions of absolute authority and of fundamental influence over public policy But because the organisation is after all only an organisation of violence, it involves also certain traditional rules, which have the effect of reconciling this remnant of barbarism with the growing tendency to civilisation The psychological impulses and complexes tending towards war are thus preserved and promoted by the institution called war—the system of organised violence in the relation between Governments

## CHAPTER III

### THE WAR TRADERS

MODERN war is expensive. In the old days, the English king could raise a levy to fight for the crown of France, and the leader could pay, as he went, by loot. But these financial methods are not of great importance nowadays. For the more important operations of war, under present conditions, the greater nations need battleships, costing more than six million pounds each, and tanks and large quantities of bombs and shells and poison gas, not to speak of mechanical transport to bring the forces into conflict. All this has to be paid for, and the expense grows long before war breaks out. In 1933 the chief nations of the world were spending altogether about £500 million a year in preparation for war among themselves, and the more each spends, the more all the others try to spend. This is called peace. The theory seems to be that, if any one nation stopped spending so much, war against it would at once break out. Thus we are each disarmed to "the limit of safety." And so all of us continue, in every country, to pay more and more for war.

Where does this money go? Partly in salaries to members of the armed forces, but mainly to

capital-owners and workers in the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Therefore there is a very great financial interest in the maintenance of the war-system. This does not imply that generals are in their places for their pay, nor that workers in the naval yards are battenning upon the prospects of general slaughter. But it would certainly disturb the economic position of millions in all countries, if war were less likely than it is, and subconsciously every man is influenced by his desire to continue in the job by which he makes his living or by which he maintains his social position.

### *Private Manufacture of Arms*

Although the soldier is paid for his service, no one supposes that he serves only for pay. War is his business, but he does not trade in war. Not even the chairmen of the private armament firms, however, can believe that these firms work for the love of the various Governments and other groups to whom they sell their wares. The chief purpose of a private trader is to make profits, and large profits have been made and can be made out of war and the preparation for still more war. If that source of profit were cut off, the balance of trade of some countries, such as Great Britain, would appear to be more "unfavourable," because the value of exports is calculated in assessments of national wealth, without regard to the question

whether these exports are poisonous drugs or armaments or other "goods." Thus the private trade in armaments, which is part of the war-system, is bound up with the other trade-relations of States.

Modern war involves industrial production. No doubt the mediæval guilds of armourers made some profit from the wars of kings, and the more frequently men fought for their "king and country," the more the profits increased. Some of the old nobility of England have descended from army contractors. But those were simpler days, when there were no high-explosive shells nor poison-gas bombs, no bombing aeroplanes nor tanks nor battleships, when no one pretended that he was defending his country in the high adventure of war. War "paid" the armourers, because it "paid" those who went to war for loot or territory. But even now war really "pays" some people. The demand for arms from all States and even from some political gangs not yet in power, is steady and tends to increase. The market for armaments is not depressed, even in an otherwise universal economic depression, and there is never any lack of money to pay for arms, because, if Governments cannot raise enough by taxation, they can always raise loans for this form of public utility. The State is a purchaser of arms, not of houses or bread, for its citizens. Economy is never regarded as so desirable in the case of the armed forces as in the case of the civil services, and that is not merely



a habit of Governments—it has the full approval of the great majority in all countries. The private trade in war-material is profitable, because there is an immense and world-wide popular demand for the instruments of destruction.

The supply of arms is provided in some countries partly by the State itself, in its own arsenals and naval dockyards, but these are inheritances from earlier times. Nowadays no State could depend upon its own manufacture for its armaments, unless it took over, as in Russia, the whole of industry, because modern war does not allow of a clear distinction between manufacture for war and manufacture for ordinary civilian uses. Thus every Government desires to have under its control, in preparation for war, a surplus of manufacturing capacity for arms, more than is required for supplying arms in the peace-time preparation for war, and this involves the use for peace-time products of machinery and power, suitable at other times, for war. The greatest armament firms are not armament firms only, but what they are otherwise is only a form of preparedness for making more armaments. Again, all kinds of other war-time needs—clothing for armies, sand-bags, barbed wire and vehicles for transport, are needed also in time of peace, so that all kinds of industries, not necessarily those for armaments alone, may derive gain from war and the preparation for it. The great appetite for armaments and the close relation of modern war-products to the

ordinary products of industry make it difficult to say which firms or which factories are armament firms or factories

### *Influence of Private Traders*

There is, however, a sufficiently definite trade in arms. There are private firms in some countries which produce guns and warships and bombing aeroplanes, which cannot in any sense be regarded as useful for peace. These firms advertise the instruments of destruction and they have agents in all the chief capitals. It is true that armament firms do not make the original appetite for war, from which they derive their gain, as drug-sellers do not give the drug-addict his original desire for drugs. But agents of armament firms greatly stimulate the appetite for arms among Governments, sometimes by bribing officials who place orders for warships and guns, sometimes by frightening them with news of the armament programmes of their neighbours. As a prelude to the war of 1914, many war-trade scandals were revealed in 1913 and early in 1914, concerning bribes for increased orders from armament firms. It was shown in April 1913, in the German Reichstag, that Krupps' agent in Berlin had bribed German officers in the Navy and Army departments. In January 1914, a French correspondent in St Petersburg falsely reported that Krupps were going to buy the chief Russian armament

works, whereupon capital was advanced in France and new armament orders were shared between the French and British armament firms. In June 1914 in Japan, it was revealed that a Japanese admiral had received bribes from the chief British armament firms, for new orders<sup>1</sup>. And that bribery still continues to be one of the means by which armament firms obtain orders from Government Departments was revealed in the Rumanian scandal of 1933. "Towards the end of March 1933, the Rumanian fiscal authorities discovered that the Czech armaments firm of Skoda had evaded taxes. They instituted an inquiry at the offices of Bruno Seletski, the firm's chief representative in Bucharest. The search led to the discovery of secret files and military documents in his bureau." Charges of corruption were brought against Seletski, and "General Sica Popescu, who, when he was Secretary-General, had arranged an agreement for a very large ordnance order with Skoda shot himself in his study"<sup>2</sup>. It was revealed that many Ministers of the Rumanian Government had received bribes. In 1931 it was proved by a Government Commission in Sweden that Swedish officers in the air force had received bribes for orders<sup>3</sup>. And these are only a few accidental revelations.

But besides bribes, "war scares" also are useful to armament firms. For example, in the summer

<sup>1</sup> See *The War Traders*, G. H. Perris, 1914.

<sup>2</sup> *Patriotism Ltd.*, 1933, U.D.C. Pamphlet.

<sup>3</sup> *The Times*, November 11th, 1931.

of 1930 there was a scare in Rumania, on the ground that the Soviet Government was preparing to invade Bessarabia. But the alarms in Rumanian circles suddenly ceased, and the Patriarch told M. Goga, a Rumanian Member of Parliament, that there was no need to be alarmed any longer, as "we have just sent a large order for war material to the Skoda works".<sup>1</sup> Similarly at an earlier date, in March 1909, Mr. H. H. Mulliner, managing director of the Coventry Ordnance Company, was received by the British Cabinet. He told them about an acceleration of the production of armaments in Germany, and the Cabinet decided upon an increase of naval expenditure, part of which went to the Coventry Ordnance Company. The story about Germany was afterwards proved to be false, but it is not known whether Mr. Mulliner himself believed it. Even quite innocent generals and admirals and newspaper editors can be made the instruments of a war scare for the sale of armaments.

### *Obstruction to Disarmament*

A more general activity of armament firms is that of obstructing possible agreements for the reduction of armaments. The best known example of this is the Shearer case. An American writer for the newspapers named William Shearer in 1929 sued the three largest shipbuilding Companies in

<sup>1</sup> See *Patriarch Ltd*, U D C., 1933

the United States for payment due to him for his efforts to prevent the success of the Naval Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1927. Shearer's duties included support for Navy bills in the Lobby of Congress at Washington, articles in the Press, and addresses to societies in favour of armaments. The same Shearer was at Geneva for the Disarmament Conference in 1932.<sup>1</sup> The more subtle agents of armament firms do not appear in public but work behind the scenes to spread rumours and create suspicions in order to prevent agreement between Governments for the reduction of arms. The shares of the firms which manufacture bombing aircraft increased in value in November 1933 as soon as spokesmen of the British Government in Parliament indicated that agreement as to reduction might not be reached.

Another characteristic of the trade in arms is its connection with the Press. There are capitals in which the correspondents of great English newspapers are also agents of great English armament firms. Similar connections, no doubt, exist in the newspapers of many countries, but in France, in addition, there is actual ownership or control of the chief Paris newspapers by armament firms. The *Journal des Débats* was purchased by the chief organisation in France for promoting the sale of armaments, under the direction of M. de Wendel. The *Temps* is partly controlled by the same

<sup>1</sup> See *The Secret International*, U D C, 1932, and C. A. Beard *The Navy Defence or Portent*, 1932, Harpers, N. Y.

interests, and the *Echo de Paris* initiated a public collection to fight against the reduction of arms by France while the Disarmament Conference of 1932-33 was sitting.

Some armament firms of different nations are connected financially Vickers-Armstrongs is associated with many firms, in Japan and other countries, which work closely in connection, and as the Latvian Government complained to the Disarmament Conference in 1933, an international price-ring of armament firms squeezes high profits out of impecunious Governments needing "defences" The firms which sell arms to any Government have no objection to the sale of arms to other Governments by other firms This is the one trade in which supplying the market in one corner does not decrease the market in another but actually leads to more markets Even when war is actually being waged, the armament firms of the belligerent countries sometimes arrange to prevent harm being done to their property, as in the case of the Briey coalfield in France, which was captured by the Germans in 1914 and protected by the French property-owners from being bombed by French aircraft Also after the war, a firm in one belligerent country received royalties from a firm in the other, for the use of patents in killing the fellow-citizens of the former Such is the trade in war A sub-committee of a League of Nations Commission has expressed the situation as follows "(1) Armament firms have been active

## THE WAR TRADERS

in fomenting war scares and in persuading their own countries to adopt warlike policies and to increase their armaments, (2) armament firms have attempted to bribe Government officials both at home and abroad, (3) they have disseminated false reports concerning the military and naval programmes of various countries in order to stimulate armament expenditure; (4) they have sought to influence public opinion through the control of newspapers in their own and foreign countries, (5) they have organised international armament trusts through which the armaments race has been accentuated by playing off one country against another, (6) they have organised international armament trusts which have increased the price of armaments to Governments"<sup>1</sup> But such candour is unusual in official documents and the chief Governments have effectually prevented the League from discussing the private manufacture of arms

### *Patriotic Societies*

Meantime those who make profits out of war and the prospects of future war have many *aliases*. They pose as patriots in all countries and their patriotism is genuine if they are sufficiently simple-minded. There are some in every country who quite honestly believe that they are working for "their country" when by selling arms they squeeze profits out of foreigners or fellow-citizens

<sup>1</sup> *Report, A 81, 1921, T M C*

The Navy League in Great Britain is supported financially by Vickers-Armstrongs, the firm which makes armour-plate, the Navy League in the United States had among its "founders," Mr Charles M Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Mr J P Morgan of the U S Steel Corporation, and Col R M Thompson of the International Nickel Company, as well as persons closely connected with the private manufacture of armaments. Similarly the German Navy League before the Great War, was brought into existence by von Tirpitz who used Krupps and other great industrial concerns to support the idea that a navy "pays"<sup>1</sup>. All societies in any country which advocate the increase of the defences of that country are supported financially by those who supply "defences" at a good profit. That is part of the institution called war.

### *Plans for Control*

The private trade in armaments tends to cause war chiefly because of its agents abroad and its relation to the Press. Both these sources of danger would be removed if all manufacture of armaments were undertaken by Governments. The Governments of the great States, particularly France, the United States and Great Britain would have to supply arms to the Governments of the

<sup>1</sup> See E Kehr, *Schlachtflottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-1902*, Berlin, 1930



other States, but they would presumably not tout for orders. Such a plan would perhaps tie this or that small State more definitely to this or that Great Power than is now the case, for the manufacturing Government would exact terms for its supply. On the other hand, the abolition of private traders might lead many more States to set up the manufacture of arms for themselves, and would therefore tend to increase in the world as a whole the number of persons deriving incomes from the danger of war. These difficulties could indeed be overcome by a proper arrangement of free purchase from any Government, but these difficulties are not the real obstacles to the abolition of private trade in arms. The real obstacle is, first, the widespread hostility to any "socialistic" scheme for reducing the opportunities of private profit. It will be said that, if States take over the manufacture of arms to-day, they will take over house-building to-morrow. And secondly, many persons with great influence now have shares and derive incomes from the present arrangement. Again, one State might take over all its citizens' arms-manufactures and another State might not, which some would regard as an advantage to the second State in case of war, for a private trade in arms is always expanding through its sales abroad. It seems unlikely therefore that there will be any general "nationalisation" of the manufacture of arms. Even the danger of war will not induce those in control of public policy in the Great

Powers to reduce the prospects for private profit

The more immediate practical plan is the supervision and control of the private manufacture of arms. Each Government could then prevent the toutting for orders by agents abroad, or the competitive cheapening of war material in order to push up the price when their sale has increased the danger of war. Some believe that the control of the *traffic* in arms by export licences, as contrasted with the control of *manufacture*, would be enough to eliminate the evil, but controlling the traffic does not affect the touttings for orders, nor the buying of the Press, nor other tricks of the trade. Any honest attempt to reduce the danger of war should involve close inspection and control of all the methods used by the private manufacturers of arms. Their accounts must be inspected by the Governments and finally by an international commission. But to save themselves from that, if it were at all likely, the great armament firms would do their best to bring on a war more rapidly. The nature of war is nowhere seen more clearly. It is a jungle of atavistic impulses, primitive social standards and reckless appetites for private gain. While some are trying to reduce the likelihood of war, others are working to increase the chances of gain opened up by war and the risk of more war. While some are trying to reduce the appetite for war, others are increasing the power of destruction in case war should occur. And now

large sections of industry, which in earlier times, would have suffered in war, are drawn into the gamble for higher profits when the States of the world use violence to support their policies

### *The Chemical Industry*

One of the most striking changes in the trade for war is the use of the chemical industry. Explosives are now required on a large scale but the new poisons offer a still larger field for profit. Thus the use made in the Great War of the chemical discoveries of the nineteenth century was only a preliminary experiment in killing. "The German cloud attacks between December 1915 and August 1916 yielded an average death-rate of twenty-five per cent, rising as high as forty-six per cent in one particular attack—on August 8th, 1916. Then the cloud arrived during divisional relief in congested trenches—a condition very similar to gas from the air falling on panic-stricken civilians in town streets, with a very good chance of still higher mortality in the absence possibly of gas-mask protection and certainly of gas discipline"<sup>1</sup> But we have advanced since 1918. The years of peace have been used to discover new poisons for war. The old poison-gas "came into contact with the outer surface and membranes of the body, which are physically resistant." The new poisons would pierce below the outer membranes by means of

<sup>1</sup> Lefebure, *Scientific Disarmament*, p. 193

poison bullets in machine-guns, thus "increasing the mortality of these guns to about fifty per cent and one hundred per cent"<sup>1</sup> Again, the food supplies could be attacked in new ways. Thus in 1923 in a Report to the League of Nations, Professor Cannon of the Harvard Medical School writes "By means of airplanes large territories could be strewn with parasites that would undergo natural increase in numbers and that might devastate large areas" It "pays" many persons and many firms, even during peace, to give their minds and their other energies to the supply of these new necessities for the sovereign State, and the Governments, with the approval of the majority of their citizens, promote by public expenditure all these new sources of profit in the means of destruction.

### *Imperialism and Finance*

But not only the manufacturers of arms gain from war. In some cases, as in the Boer War and in the Spanish-American War, the traders and financiers of a nation can induce a Government to support their private interest by force of arms, for although war may not "pay" a whole nation, it can be made to "pay" certain groups. Similarly, the conquest of colonial territory may be advantageous to groups of persons with capital to invest, as in the French descent upon Tunis in 1881, and

<sup>1</sup> *Id.*, p. 211

the Japanese descent upon Manchuria in 1931. Thus the "Nationalism" which serves to excuse war in one generation is transformed into the "Imperialism" which serves to excuse it in the next. A Great Power can always "improve" the administration of a backward people or of a sphere of influence, by force of arms, and the gain from the improvement, paid for out of public funds of the Great Power and future taxation of the inhabitants of the conquered area, will accrue to the traders and capital-owners of the Great Power. Even in such cases, however, not gain but "defence" of interests or rights or neighbouring territories is the reason given by the Government which undertakes war.

Finally, so long as war is possible, those with money to invest will secure a higher rate of interest in time of war. The State enters into the market for loans in time of war or of the danger of war, and the price of capital rises. In States dependent upon oversea supplies the war-risk increases the profits of ship-owners. And although the general uncertainty as to the outcome of any war may be injurious to some investors, the banks and the brokers usually contrive to make good profits in a time of financial uncertainty. These are not direct causes of war. The investors who lose from war are probably as many as those who gain. But that anyone should gain from war creates a tendency, more or less strong, towards war. The war-system, therefore, is thoroughly entangled

with the whole structure of production and finance, and the vested interests in that structure tend to perpetuate the danger of future war to which they have become accustomed

The influence of those organised "interests" which derive gain from war and from the preparation for war is difficult to trace, because it operates largely through personal contacts and social pressures. In the old days the king or the queen would openly take shares in a privateering expedition and would derive some very tangible cash from "prizes" taken in war. But now the distribution of the spoil is more subtle. In the pursuit of some new opening for the investment of capital abroad, for example, the diplomatists on the spot and the officials of Foreign Offices at home may be very useful. Each important capital or financial centre includes both the promoters of companies and the officials of the State in the same social circles. Those who live in slums in Glasgow or in Lyons do not give dinners to diplomatists, but company promoters do. And in some countries the placing of capital abroad is quite consciously used by the officials and Ministers of State in the pursuit of a policy of national expansion or peaceful penetration or military alliance. Thus financiers and diplomatists in any one nation play into one another's hands. This may be objectionable. It would not, however, lead to war, but for the fact that one nation's financiers and diplomatists may be playing for the stakes against

another nation's financiers and diplomatists. In such a situation, "the stakes of diplomacy" may be so valuable that the final hazard of war is tried. Or the two gangs may be playing for control of some particular commodity—for example, oil, or some field for export, and so we have "the war of steel and gold" leading to real war and the deaths of common folk in the trenches. Or again several financial circles may combine to exert joint diplomatic pressure upon a country not powerfully organised for war, as in the case of China at the beginning of this century. The extraction of Treaty Ports and extra-territorial rights there, by threats of force, however necessary they were for European traders to feel safe in Chinese trade, has probably laid up for the future a good store of war and danger of war.

Thus traders in the supply of the material for war and other traders who are willing to use the threat of war, when it is likely to be useful for profit, combine to make the relations between the peoples unstable. They could not, however, actually cause war even by their appetite for gain, if diplomacy itself were not corrupted by the national egoism which makes the diplomatist and the Foreign Minister regard himself as an agent for a separate national advantage in rivalry with others. But the tradition which perpetuates that obsolete attitude is preserved in the conventional history and the present practice of diplomacy in its worst aspects. These must now be discussed.

## CHAPTER IV

### HISTORY AND FAIRY-TALE

ALL the peculiar beliefs and customs so far described are covered with a rosy mist of romance in the traditional teaching of history. War is the favourite subject of historians. From the earliest times the bards entertained warriors, and how could they be better entertained than by hearing their praises sung? The bards forgot and the warriors despised the craftsmen who made the swords and built the ships that sailed to Troy. But that primitive attitude and the primitive form of admiration which it expressed exists even to-day among those whose minds are still primitive, for civilised moral standards and civilised conduct are not acceptable to everyone in any age. The early chroniclers took up the tradition of the bards, and kings and knights were accepted at their own valuation. The scholar tends to admire what is very different from himself, and therefore he perpetuates barbarism with the resources of civilisation. History thus becomes a pageant of noble warriors, with a motley crowd of followers in the background, who may be useful as instruments of glory and, after the slaughter is over, may cheer the triumph of the



great man The ladies were understood to prefer their heroes to have killed many enemies, even if they did not actually bring back the scalps

Later historians depended for their knowledge of past events upon the simple-minded chroniclers who had selected only what primitive minds thought important. Historians readily swallow the moral standards along with the record of events in the writings of earlier historians. And so the record of battles, or rather, in any properly conducted history, of victories, came to be the chief subject in history. It was easier to find accounts of them in the old chronicles than to find descriptions of common life. Battles did not explain most of what needed explanation in the development of civilised life; but that fact did not dawn upon the earlier historians, and even to-day, in most schools and text-books, the history of any nation in its foreign contacts is mainly a record of battles, not of improved intercourse between peoples. The "great" men put before boys and girls are warriors, with most of their actual deeds carefully hidden, and almost all the monuments of our cities commemorate local politicians or warriors, not the scientists or artists of the world. In the record of its relation to other nations, each nation solemnly treats itself as the only centre of civilisation, occasionally affected by "foreign influences." The greater historians, since the middle of the nineteenth century, have escaped from the atmosphere of war and freed themselves from the

primitive moral standards of the past. But most teachers and writers of history, even to-day, perpetuate in schools and universities the old obsession with war.

### *Falsehood in History*

War, however, as a subject for history, would be excusable if the truth were told about it by the historians. But the truth is not told. The very prominence given to it misrepresents the facts, for if history is an explanation of the present by reference to the past, our customs to-day are more easily explained by one visit to our country of a foreign scholar than by ten expeditions of our more bloodthirsty forefathers to slaughter foreigners. Trade explains our roads and our clothes. Battles explain only why we know so little after so many years. The first truth about war, which the historians omit, is that war has been the chief cause of the delay in the development of civilised life. The great advances in Assyria, in Egypt, in Persia, in Greece and Rome were each of them destroyed by war. Each advance towards settled order and the finer arts of living was lost to those who came after, and each type of civilisation had to begin again from the beginning. If we moderns had been able to take over from Greece and Rome even what they alone had achieved, without the ruin and loss of their tradition in the Dark Ages, we should be more civilised than we now are.

But in the Dark Ages our forefathers had to begin again, almost as far back in culture as the heroes of Homer. And the gap in the tradition of civilisation seems even greater, if we think of what was known in ancient Egypt and lost by war, before the Greeks made their advance. War is not indeed the only cause of this loss, but it is the chief cause.

### *The Waste of War*

The history of all past wars indicates that great stores of civilised life, the materials for civilisation and the knowledge useful for maintaining it, have been destroyed from time to time by war. Even war undertaken for loot or trade has involved more loss than gain, if both parties to the conflict are considered. To obtain gold or slaves at the cost of slaughter, destruction and general confusion, is like burning a house to roast a pig. But still more—the accumulated energies which have been wasted in conflict throughout human history would have more than sufficed to raise all civilisation to levels much higher than our own. The amount of capital and labour expended upon past wars and the preparation for future wars was altogether waste, if any other method was possible for deciding which claim to rights should prevail, and to assume that no other method has been, or is now, possible, is to ignore the fact that history includes many examples of such methods. Indeed

the advance made after any great war when peace is made, is proof that different claims have been adjusted during periods when the more violent groups of men are exhausted by mutual slaughter. Nations have in fact traded and negotiated as well as fought, and the methods of trade and negotiation have been of benefit to both parties in the transaction. War has always injured at least one, and more commonly all parties to it. But all this is not discussed by the historians.

Again history tends to emphasise the success of "defence" in any war, for nowadays historians do not openly praise aggression or conquest. Many wars are supposed to have been waged for the sake of "liberty", and those wars are made to serve as excuses for any war. But if any war was waged for "liberty" on one side, the other side must have been waging war for the suppression of liberty. Either one side was wrong to wage war or both were mistaken in waging it and therefore every war was wrong or mistaken, on one side or on both. But the historians usually omit to point out the evil in the situation which necessitates "defence" on the part of any nation, or causes any nation to "defend" its liberties because of unjust war.

Again, historians profess to find "decadence" in nations which have been beaten in war or in those which have not resisted conquest. No one is supposed to honour such people. But historians pay honour to those who have conquered others, although they, and not the conquered, are guilty of

whatever moral defects their conquest has caused in others. It is hardly fair to blame a man for lying on his face, if another man, who happens to be stronger, is stamping on him. It is the man on top who is to blame for the slavishness or submissiveness or other effects of the impotence of the other. If nations are "decadent" morally because they have been subdued by force, what is the moral character of those who subdue them? By the historians, it is usually praised!

Historians accept what happened, as if nothing else could have happened, and indeed it is no business of theirs to consider anything but the facts. But to say that war did occur or even that it had to occur, is by no means a proof that it must still occur or that it ought to occur, and yet these false beliefs are implied in the unnoticed assumptions of many historians. Their admiration for the success of conquerors leads them to assume that victory proves virtue and prevents their putting on record the results of victory upon the defeated. They confuse the moral judgment with a statement of fact. But if history includes only the brighter side of war, it implies that war is desirable, and indeed history is now written for that very purpose in certain nations.

### *Fairy-tale not History*

The traditional history, however, not only omits relevant facts with regard to war, it also per-

petuates the gossip of the village pump. Most traditional history is merely fairy-tale. The English learn English history, the French learn French history. And each nation reads only of wars in which it was successful and battles in which it was victorious. The English, for example, learn of Crécy and Agincourt, without reference to certain disagreeable facts, such as the murder of prisoners, but they hear very little of the way in which the English were eventually driven out of France. The French, on the other hand, regard Agincourt as of no importance, and they are much more impressed by Napoleon's victories than by his final defeat. It is part of the fairy-tale that "we," the British schoolboys of 1934, were victorious at Trafalgar or, if "we" are French, at Austerlitz. Victory is always due to "our" own excellence, and defeat can be explained as an accident. So the Germany of to-day has learnt to regard its defeat in the field in 1918 as due to wicked Socialists behind the lines, not to the failure of its generals and diplomatists. Every war, therefore, is considered by the younger generation as a prelude to victory, and defeat is so seldom mentioned in any national history that no nation thinks there is any risk of defeat in a future war.

Again, in the record of war, the actual battles are misrepresented in the traditional history, because, in the first place, the torture and dreadful deaths of thousands of young men on both sides are not mentioned. Methods of slaughter are

called the "Art" of war. The "plans" of battles, which schoolboys study, contain little rectangles to represent the men who fought on both sides! These men are treated as physical forces in contact. Their feelings are carefully forgotten. And "Wellington" fights "Napoleon" at Waterloo in the traditional fairy-story, whereas in fact some poor John Smith had his throat cut by some equally puzzled Jacques Bonhomme, neither of them knowing in the least what it was all about. Louis XIV "wins a victory" by sitting among his mistresses some miles away from the fighting, while poor men, having no quarrel and no glory, whatever happens, kill and maim other poor men. If any historian candidly described a battle or a war, the game would be up! The shabby and disgusting reality would make history obviously unsuitable for schools. Therefore we give children fairy-tale and call it history.

The two most interesting types of character in the fairy-tale are nations, conceived as persons, and certain generals or admirals, conceived as heroes. Thus war is described mythologically as a conflict between "England" and "France," or "America" and "Spain." England "wins" in the English histories and France in the French histories, or, in a more modern version, "we" wake up, after a succession of bloody and destructive struggles, and find that "we" have possessed ourselves of half the habitable world "in a fit of absence of mind." How innocent "England" appears! And how

could "France" do otherwise than conquer Algiers, Tunis and Morocco? But not in absence of mind, for that is not admired in France. These mysterious beings, England and France, that win battles and share victory with "us" who read the history of them, are not condemned morally, because obviously the majority actually living at any date are not guilty. But a subtle moral approval can be diffused about the whole story by the historian's premonitions of the "use" to be made of victory in civilising the survivors of defeat. And so war is made to seem chiefly an instrument of progress. The means, which are not morally condemned, are justified by the end, which is judged only from the point of view of the victors. The vanquished do not write history. The best of them are dead, and the remainder enslaved. But the immortals, who are the nations, England or France, go merrily on.

The successful general or admiral fills a great place in the text-books. That is part of the fairy-tale. Indeed it is seriously argued by some teachers that children are not interested in other kinds of men. It may be so, but if so, then stories of Deadwood Dick or of famous criminals would be even more suitable as a means of arousing their interests. History, however, is not usually supposed to be brought to the attention of children for the same reason as detective stories are written. And it may be suspected that any teacher who says that his pupils have no interest in anything else,



is really excusing his own inability to understand anything else. The general or admiral as hero is merely a mover of "forces" and a director of slaughter. What he did and why he did it, in terms of flesh and blood, are never reported. He is shown riding on a charger or walking a quarter-deck or examining a map, and he may indeed have been a very honest and courageous person. But the importance of that sort of work in the genuine history of civilised life, is exceedingly small. To exaggerate its value is mere fairy-tale.

### *Modern War*

In the old days, in the records of battles, only the generals and admirals were mentioned, but since the middle of the nineteenth century the "common people" have learnt to read and write. Therefore since then the sufferings of the "common" soldiers have been on record, and the Great War gave birth to a new literature of battle—no longer in the terms of the traditional fairy-tale. The old-fashioned chronicle of "glorious" deeds still continues in official histories and in accounts given by such primitive minds as Mr. Winston Churchill's. But too many ex-soldiers know the facts. Battle and war are now described in the plays and poems and novels and autobiographies of the disillusioned. Even pictures of battles are not as mythological as they used to be. No longer in paintings of victory does the general, on a

charger from Bond Street, point to the foe, while most of them fall dead at the approach of "our" men. Glory is not what it was!

Descriptions of the facts of war need not be quoted here. They can be found in Sheriff's *Journey's End*, Barbusse's *Under Fire*, Duhamel's *Vie des Martyrs*, Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Sassoon's poems, and in calmer tones, in Vera Brittain's *Testament of Youth*. Not only the anguish and maiming and madness of youth but the utter futility of the result is borne in upon the modern mind. An attempt is made by some romantic persons to argue that "the whole story" of war is not one of horror, and clearly it is not. But heroism and fellowship in danger do not make the record of the actual evil in war less important. The historians of the future will have entirely new kinds of chronicles to use, if they ever find it convenient to tell the truth about war and perhaps in some future generation history will no longer be fairy-tale when it deals with war.

### *History as Propaganda*

The traditional fairy-tale, however, still continues to affect public policy. Governments can still rely upon their subjects taking a romantic view of war, and some Governments, such as the Nazi Government in Germany, actually suppress any literature giving another view. The literature which expresses disagreeable facts about the Great

War is naturally not good for preparations to fight another war. All preparations for war are more willingly undertaken, if the young men being trained for it are not allowed to envisage the reality too clearly. Thus one may practise thrusting a bayonet into a bag of sand, without thinking too precisely about the man whom one is thus learning to kill. Shooting at targets seems harmless enough, and if the other man's eyes are far away, it will not trouble the warrior much to blow them out with a bullet. The traditional method of raising recruits is to ask who is willing to die for his country, not who is willing to kill for his country, and yet obviously the armed forces are trained to kill, not to die. The very same results as were achieved by poison-gas and high-explosive in the Great War are now aimed at by all nations preparing for a future war, but history is not used to describe to the new generation what the effects of their own actions will be when they go to war. It is used to blind them to what is being prepared and to what they themselves are expected to do.

### *The History of Peace*

History fails to show how war as an institution has obstructed all the efforts, continually being made in every age, to secure the peaceful intercourse between nations which is natural to men in their senses. But it should at least include some account of the attempts to avoid war. Peace

in the traditional history is treated as if it were only the outcome of victory, and victory can never establish real peace. That kind of peace is a desolation. The other peace, the real peace which forestalls and does not follow war, has been advocated in many countries for many generations, but the historians ignore it. In China, which is in this matter more civilised than Europe, the warrior has never been highly honoured. The scholar and the merchant rank above him, according to Chinese moral standards, and a Chinese teacher has said—"that general is best who wins a victory without fighting a battle." In India, the Buddhist reform was a protest against violence, especially in war. There is a record of diplomacy and arbitration as an alternative to war in ancient Babylonia about 4000 B.C., and the method was highly developed in ancient Greece and in the Middle Ages.<sup>1</sup>

In the early days of Christianity some Christians held that a Christian ought not to be a soldier, but perhaps that was because of certain pagan rituals connected with service in the army and not because of an objection to war. In the most civilised period of the Roman Empire there was a widespread disinclination for service in the armed forces, and throughout the Middle Ages there were organised efforts to prevent the knights and barons making war. The Brethren of Peace, even in the barbarism of the eleventh century, preached peace,

<sup>1</sup> M. N. Tod, *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks*

and the Truce of God was an attempt to subdue the appetite for loot and glory. Definite plans for the avoidance of war were made, one after another, from the Renaissance until our own day. Sully and Kant and the Abbé de S. Pierre were the authors of the most famous of these plans, but they remained merely literary efforts without any effect upon those in control of government. Just before the Great War, however, even kings and statesmen were inclined to consider the means of avoiding war, and arbitration of disputes between Governments seemed then to be the best method. But the Great War brought about a more general feeling that war should be prevented, and those in control of governments then were inclined to advance somewhat farther than had seemed possible before.

The League of Nations was established for the prevention of war and the organisation of peace. Its structure, functions and history for the past fifteen years, have been described fully in many books and pamphlets. Here it must be considered only by contrast with the institution of war, which still dominates the relation between governments. In theory the League is an agreement between certain Governments that they shall work together, in an established organisation, for certain common goods. The Governments may thus more easily promote the health of their peoples and their communications and transport. In the International Labour Office of the League the Governments may promote the improvement of conditions in indus-

try In the International Court, which is loosely connected with the League, certain disputes may be brought to an end by legal decisions But by far the most important function of the League is the general facility it offers for continual conferences and discussion in order that conflicting interests should not lead to the crises which involve Governments in war The Council and the Assembly thus forestall the danger of war, and the Secretariat is at work all the time, bridging the gap which sometimes results from bad temper and misunderstanding on the part of Governments—a gap not always successfully bridged by the older parts of the diplomatic system The League, then, is in theory a system for preventing war by forestalling the crises which may give rise to war In theory the Members of the League are at work as friends upon this common task And this is only the latest phase of a very long development which history should explain

### *The State a Substitute for War*

The League system, however, is only one effect, within the sphere of government, of the increasing need for intercourse between all peoples It is important chiefly because the peace which is necessary for advance in the arts of life and in the sciences has in the League system at last begun profoundly to affect the relations between the States of the world, and States, not men in other

relations, make war. It is not "human nature" or "the nature of things" but only those peculiar institutions called States which prepare and pursue war. It should be made clear by history that States are only groups of men in one particular form of relationship, but the historians have deified "the State." It is assumed, quite falsely, to be natural that one State should be in "the posture of a gladiator" with regard to any other State. But a candid history that eschewed fairy-tale would describe how the advance in the art of government, limping behind the other arts, had gradually spread the area over which peace prevails. Peace, in this sense, is not an interval between wars nor a preparation for future wars, but a *substitute for war*. It is the principle that the parties to any dispute about rights shall not have the final decision as to their own rights and shall not use their own force as a means of maintaining them. This gives the experiments of the past a new meaning. At first individuals and families prepared for war between themselves, but it was found more convenient to use argument, judgment and the authority of the more inclusive community in order to adjust claims. It was in fact more convenient because the good that each desired was more likely to be obtained in that way. Then cities or larger groups of families prepared for war between themselves, and afterwards travel and trade made it more convenient to use the method of judgment and wider authority also in their relations. It was

not superior force which eliminated the conflict of minor forces within any community. It was the growing sense of a larger community which eliminated the conflict of localities within the nation, and force came in only to support a sense of community which had already developed. But at each stage "war" was removed from a more limited sphere only to be used in a larger sphere, and since the Middle Ages in Europe the most popular plan of most of those who wished to eliminate war between States was to unite all the States in a common war upon some non-European enemy in a crusade or holy war. Even to-day, the mediæval conception of a crusade is attractive to some advocates of peace. They propose not to abolish war but to consecrate it to a "higher" purpose, although nowadays not Turks nor Moors, but a mythologically conceived "aggressive nation" is supposed to be the enemy of all the rest. This too is due to past history, and chiefly to the traditional conception of "us," the virtuous, opposed to wicked others.

### *Civilisation International*

The growth of civilisation has obviously depended upon the use of genius in art or science, wherever it occurs. Our knowledge of the universe is dependent upon the scholars and scientists of one locality or language being able freely to use the insight of those of other localities or languages



We should not be so secure from disease as we are, without the combined results of the work of Pasteur, a Frenchman, Lister, an Englishman, and Ehrlich, a German. Similarly in the arts, all men gain from the combined influences of Purcell, an Englishman, Beethoven, a German, and Debussy, a Frenchman. Every nation has contributed something to the common store. And even the common basis of life in food and clothing is what it is because of commodities coming from the ends of the earth to every corner of it. Against that background, war is obviously futile. Government in States has promoted by law and order the advance of civilised life within each frontier, and the same art of government is now timidly and tentatively extending law and order across the frontiers of all States by diplomacy, the Treaty system and the League. But instead of eliminating altogether the principle of war, progress in the art of government is obstructed because the States of the world are regarded by the majority of their citizens as essentially instruments of war. Every State contradicts the very principle upon which it rests its claim to the loyalty of its citizens by denying in practice the application of that principle to its relations with other States. The State rests upon the principle of peace, and each actual State behaves as if it had inherited the manners and customs of the brigands it has dispossessed. That is the result of bad history.

*The League Denied by its Members*

Thus even the States members of the League remain armed one against the other. History can show that some advance has been made in the elimination of war, but each Government, even to-day while working for peace, keeps one eye upon the traditional war-system. All Governments, within as well as outside the League, are armed against their neighbours. None trusts the other enough to disregard the possibility of attack from that other. Each spies upon the other by the old method of bribing citizens to betray their country. Each looks about for possible allies or friends in case of war. And not only States outside the League are suspected of "aggressive" designs, for plans are proposed from time to time, in case the actual members of the League should be aggressive as between themselves.

Thus the members of the League co-operate as men do when they shake hands, but have revolvers ready in their other hands. The members of the League are not peculiar in carrying revolvers. All States behave at times like gangsters, but some of the gangsters have joined a club. The war-system survives inside the club as well as outside, but the absurdity is less obvious in the case of States than it would be among individuals, because one Minister of any State can shake hands, while another holds the revolver. In plain terms, the polite speeches of Prime Ministers and Foreign

Secretaries at Geneva make no difference to the activities of the War Departments at the various capitals. The League is then said to be a failure or an "absurdity," as Mussolini has called it. But clearly the League system has never yet been taken seriously. One can hardly say that it is the fault of the rules of the club, if the members persist in threatening to use their revolvers among themselves in defiance of those rules. The League would be good enough, if anyone in power believed in it, but apparently every statesman thinks that he can profess peace sincerely and yet maintain the old institution of war—of course, only in case somebody else's profession of peace is not honest! The history of the past, misread and misinterpreted, reaches up from the grave like a ghost to prevent us seeing even our own interests.

### *War still Dominant*

War as an institution has remained, with all its historical associations, so dominant in the minds of men, that they assume its continuing to exist, even while they announce that they work only for peace. The latest event in the history of war is that some of the nations are leaving the League—the gangsters are leaving the club. They say that the other members of the club are neither honest nor polite, which is indeed the truth. After the murder of several statesmen in Japan and the seizure of power by a military clique, the

Japanese Government announced its resignation from the League, because the Japanese conquest of Manchuria was mildly criticised by some representatives of other Governments. After the seizure of power in Germany by another kind of group, and its suppression by torture and imprisonment of all criticism within Germany, the Nazi Government also resigned from the League, in October 1933, apparently because it believed its prestige suffered from negotiation about disarmament. War rises up to scatter the beginnings of peace whenever the influences tending to peace seem to become stronger, and in modern times war itself seeks the prestige of peace, for all those who prepare for future war maintain that their particular kind of war leads to peace. This is the most disastrous effect of fairy-tale, taken as history, for all genuine history shows that the preparation for war breeds new war and that all war leads to more war.

## CHAPTER V

### DIPLOMACY AND SOVEREIGNTY

THE diagnosis of war has shown that it survives as an itaivism in modern civilisation, partly because of obsolete beliefs, based upon defective imagination and bad history, partly because of the traditional institutions of a caste society, which are supported by those who derive financial advantage from them. But civilised Man, the patient, has been trying for centuries to throw off the disease. The description of his efforts must now be continued; for the art of government, like the art of medicine, is gradually improved both by discovery of cures and by the better understanding of the conditions necessary for good health.

For some generations war has been regarded as at least regrettable, and the more usual activities of Governments in their intercourse have been diplomatic. Diplomacy is the name for a method of negotiation, persuasion and conciliation for promoting the common interests of different nations, and adjusting those interests which are opposed. The policy expressed through diplomacy is nowadays in the hands of Ministers of State; but the diplomatic system of officials with tradi-

tional methods has an influence of its own, apart from the policy of Ministers Foreign Offices, ambassadors and their staffs provide for most of the normal intercourse between Governments. The system is described elsewhere. Here we are concerned only with its relation to certain other parts of the system of government—mainly the War Departments, for the diplomatic system is both a consequence and a corrective of the belief in irresponsible “sovereign” States, which supports modern war and the preparation for war.

In theory every Foreign Office is a “peace department,” in so far as peace implies intercourse by argument and persuasion. And most of the great ambassadors have indeed been instruments and initiators of peace. It is foolish to regard all diplomacy as dishonest and unclean, for even its obsolete tricks inherited from the century of Machiavelli, are quite unimportant by comparison to the value of the system in maintaining a continuous contact between all the States of the world. In all the great capitals there are about fifty chief representatives of foreign States, who make the diplomatic body and have some common interest and common understanding. Each capital therefore contains in itself an international organisation, and even if the formalities of diplomatic custom are a little faded, politeness of some sort is rightly assumed to be valuable. Home-keeping persons do not usually consider what very peculiar manners their own Governments or their

Ministers may adopt towards foreign peoples A polite reminder of the existence of someone else, on whose toes you are treading, may be useful at times, and ambassadors give such reminders to Foreign Ministers Without the diplomatic system, war would be more frequent than it is

Behind the diplomatic system, however, lie the preparations for war, and in certain forms of policy, the threat of war is used as an instrument of diplomacy Indeed it is questioned whether that threat is not always present in the background, even when the conversations between Governments are most polite It is, in any case, necessary to look more closely at the influence of war and the preparations for war upon diplomacy.

### *Military Attachés*

One section of the ambassadorial system includes naval, military and air attachés, who are sent by the War Departments of their Governments to reside in foreign capitals These officers of the armed forces are supposed to be part of the Secretariat in embassies, but they usually report directly to the War Departments, not through their own ambassadors, and in times of crisis, their reports have been known to contradict what their own ambassador communicates to his Government The attachés of the War Departments in connection with the foreign services insert into the diplomatic system the essentials of the war-

system. What they do in foreign countries is never fully explained. They have been known to support spies, to assist armament firms and to make arrangements for joint action with military men of the country to which they are sent. They embody the old conception of the State-system as a gentlemanly arrangement for war and its preparation. They attend manœuvres and reviews and sometimes earn foreign decorations for themselves. They learn, no doubt, new methods of warfare to be passed on to their own War Departments, and these departments and the General Staff of their own country are assisted by the attachés abroad to pursue their own policies, sometimes quite independently of Foreign Offices.

### *Warriors as Experts*

A new power has recently been given to the War Departments by the use of their officials as "experts" on problems of disarmament. At all Disarmament Conferences since the Great War diplomacy and general policy have been deflected by staff officers who "advised" on the size of armies, warships, guns and tanks. That they were "experts" even on such matters has been doubted, for although they may know how to use weapons, they do not know how to make them. The "experts" in modern armament are scientists and industrialists, but admirals apparently take quite seriously their figures about trade-routes and the



size of battleships The opposition of the admirals in the United States to the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was shown by a Senate Enquiry not to be based at all upon "expert" knowledge, but in Great Britain, France and other countries the staff officers influence their diplomatists and Ministers, behind the scenes—which is always a safer place for avoiding criticism. The most important point, however, with regard to such "experts" is that they are traditionally and by education dominated by the conception of "defence" as the natural and inevitable relationship between States Any conference, therefore, which is under any influence emanating from the War Departments of the several Governments must necessarily be reduced to efforts of each Party to leave the conference a little better "defended" than it was before If it is assumed that the "security" of any nation depends upon the superiority of its "defences," it follows that any reduction of armaments is a "sacrifice" of national interests Thus the experts of each Government propose plans for disarmament such as to leave their own Government slightly more powerful after "disarmament" than it was before Each plan offered by any Government is a plan for reducing the arms of its neighbours more than its own All experts assume that their own nation is already "disarmed to the limit of safety," because all its armaments are only for defence And politicians can easily be persuaded to repeat what the War Departments tell them The very effort

to reduce the influence of war in international affairs by a reduction of armaments has led, therefore, to an exacerbation of the "defence complex," leading to a greater danger of war, and this has been largely the work of admirals and generals, acting as "experts." All Disarmament Conferences will increase the danger of war, until those in control of Governments boldly deny that admirals and generals are experts on disarmament and send for the scientists and industrialists, for these at least know the relevant facts about the manufacture of new types of armament.

### *Other War Influences*

Two almost irrelevant factors reinforce the influence of war upon diplomacy: one is the "personal" factor—the character and outlook of persons in key-positions in diplomacy, the other is the traditional conception of trade as a sort of war. As for the "personal" element, the education of most diplomatists hitherto has been that of the traditional officer-class. The superior airs of the "best" circles of society easily support the idea of duelling for "honour" among gentlemen, which is all the more attractive if the gentlemen themselves have not to do the fighting. Also the swash-buckler type, such as Theodore Roosevelt, William II Hohenzollern and Benito Mussolini, has a freer field for threats, in questions affecting the relations between States than in domestic politics.

in the "national" interest, and even to collect foreign debts for them, if the debtors live in less powerful States. Again, the investment of capital abroad is promoted by the use of diplomacy directly in the case of France, indirectly in the case of Great Britain and the United States, and in some cases the armed forces of a State are officially regarded as instruments for economic advantage. For example, Lord Londonderry, Minister of Air and spokesman for the National Government in the House of Lords, said (29th November, 1933) "Whatever sea-power may have meant . . . as the medium of commercial activity, that older power must in future be accompanied by air-power." Thus also the Secretary of the Navy in the United States Government on 7th May, 1925, declared in reference to foreign investments "To defend America, we must be prepared to defend its interests and our flag in every corner of the globe." Trade is said to follow "the flag", and the flag is generally accompanied by a big drum and guns. Imperialism, colonial expansion and "peaceful penetration" are all phases of the same attempt to disguise the predatory habits of small groups of traders as "national interests." And because certain changes in the productive system have given new opportunities of rivalry in trade, all nations are being treated by their governments as competing grocers' shops. The scowls of the established shopkeeper when a rival sets up in his street are idealised in the lofty nationalism of politicians. And com-

mon folk are called to arms to support policies which are only ornate versions of the tricks of old-fashioned tradesmen. Even the Navy does not disdain to push trade. And a reduction in the price of exported cotton-goods may become the real cause of a war for what is then called "justice," but is only another form of cash or loot.

### *Use of War in Diplomacy*

But no office organisation nor personal bad temper nor trading interest could seriously deflect diplomacy from promoting peaceful intercourse, if the foreign policy itself of the several Governments were not actually based upon war. The threat of force may be seldom clearly expressed, but it is implied in the traditional phrases often repeated. For example, Lord Londonderry said in the House of Lords on 29th November, 1933: "When this country is disarmed, she can no longer speak with authority to the armed nations." Authority therefore is not moral authority, but mere force. In plain terms, Governments are prepared to support their claims by force of arms. Each says, in effect: "This is what we think we have a right to claim. If others will not agree, they must be compelled." The Great Powers behave as if the judgment of each on any issue is not of any value unless it is backed by armed force. And therefore the legal equality of States—a moral conception that rights are dependent

upon a moral judgment—is in practice repudiated by the diplomatic distinction between States, in reference to their armed force. This is the Great Power system. A Great Power is “great” not in the excellence of its government nor in its people’s culture, but only in its armed force. Thus the dominant group in Germany, under Hitler, felt that it had not “equal status,” and that Germany was a “second-class” nation, not because its people were in economic distress nor because its culture was diminished by brutal torture and persecution of some of its citizens, but because it had not as much armed force as its neighbours. Most of the citizens of any State claiming to be a Great Power, despise “second-class” nations such as Norway or Switzerland, which have to rely upon persuasion and not upon armed force for the maintenance of their claims. It is commonly thought to be disgraceful in international affairs that “our men” should be unable to kill and maim a sufficient number of the citizens of foreign States to impress their Governments with the opinion of one’s own Government. The so-called “democracies,” Great Britain, France and the United States, in their external relations accept the principle of Dictatorship—that any group with power to enforce its own view of what is good should use that power against all critics or opponents. This attitude affects the whole of the diplomatic intercourse between Governments, and makes it quite impossible to eliminate war.

*The Balance of Power*

War and the threat of war are instruments of diplomacy, in the last resort. If a Foreign Minister or his ambassador fails to persuade the Government of another country that his view of his nation's rights is correct, he can threaten to use armed force to maintain his view. The threat is effectual only in the case of a Great Power dealing with a small State, but no Government of a Great Power is quite certain how far such a threat may be effectual even as against another Great Power, for at the moment when the threat is made, it may not be convenient for the other Great Power to begin war. Always therefore an atmosphere of threat and accepted challenge hangs about the intercourse of States. This is called the Balance of Power. It is supposed to maintain peace, because it is convenient to prepare war for some time, before choosing the moment to declare it. But the Balance of Power is fundamentally a conception of war, actual or possible. It is both a statement of fact, a description of an actual situation, and also an indication of policy. As a description of fact it implies that States are not systems of right or justice, but of force, and that their relations are those of natural forces such as weight or pressure. The effect of that implication is to make them so.

*Philosophy of Sovereignty*

The observation that Governments do in practice use force and not moral judgment as a test of their claims has been adopted as a basis for certain pseudo-philosophies, such as those of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Hegel. The two earlier writers were at any rate honest enough to conclude that, if States are inevitably and naturally "natural forces," then morality has no relevance to public policy. That is to say, a war is not a test of right but of strength. Morality is irrelevant to the situation. The Sovereign is a mortal god, having no moral responsibility to any superior moral standard above his own will. The victor has no "right" to do anything as a result of his victory, but only the "power" to do it. This is of no importance at all if the question is one of rights, but in the theory of Hobbes there cannot be any such question as between States. The only defect in the argument of Machiavelli and Hobbes is that the assumptions and premises are wrong, but granted the premises, the conclusion is correct. If men are in fact related to other men only as physical forces, and if States embody and express only that relation, then war is natural to men in States. But it is not true that any human relations can be merely relations of physical forces.

Hegel's theory, on the other hand, and the theory of international Lawyers or jurists based upon the same principles are not only wrong, they

are absurd. Hegel argues, by a development of Spinoza's monistic theory, that war discovers what is right, and he and his followers say that war is the supreme expression of the nature and functions of the State as an expression of right. Thus he makes government an expression of the organisation of *rights* and not of *force* as between its subjects and then he proceeds to make this same government an expression of force, taken in this case as right, in its relation to the subjects of other governments. By this trick war is made into the test of rights, as if it could possibly be "right" for a heavy weight to overbalance one less heavy! Right and wrong have nothing to do with mechanics. Hegel, writing a century ago, is clearly a little out of date but the same absurdity continues to be believed. A certain Professor Kaufmann wrote in 1911 "The ultimate social ideal is not a community of free men but the victorious war" and a Professor Julius Binder published a *Philosophy of Rights* in 1925, to the same effect. The same attitude has been expressed by rhetoricians such as Thomas Carlyle. It is still seriously believed by some, and by many perhaps in mentally isolated nations, that war is a test of right, exactly as it was believed in the Middle Ages that one could distinguish a criminal from a virtuous man by setting them to fight one another. On the assumption that whatever happens is the Will of God and that God's Will is always good, if any man wins in a fight, he must be more virtuous



might is Right what is, is what ought to be. The old mythology on which that belief is based is enshrined in the phrase "God gives the victory," and in prayers for victory, to the "God of Battles." A new mythology, quoting "Darwin," maintains that war is a biological phenomenon and that "Nature" selects the victor—presumably on some moral judgment of her own as to "fitness" or perhaps only as she selects stars. Mythology survives among some of those who claim to be "scientific." On our public monuments there is still a figure of a goddess, young, glorious and joyful, called Victory whereas in fact victory would be better conceived as a gift of the devil, an ancient and degraded hag. Perhaps she is the "Nature" that selects the fittest by war. A feeling that some moral judgment is required in a question of rights continues, however, to worry believers in the current mythology and results in fantastic attempts to excuse war by reference to the force used by police or by warders of lunatics, but such analogies usually disregard the absence of any moral authority in a gang which makes itself the judge of its opponents. A sovereign State in its external relations is more like a gangster than like a policeman. All wars are "just," in so far as both sides are honest in their mistaken judgment, and all wars "unjust" in so far as one or other must have appealed to violence and not to a moral judgment in support of its own claims. Therefore at present the effort of apologists for past wars is directed to

show that "the other fellow began it"—which obviously does not reduce the moral guilt of all those who allowed the situation to exist in which he could "begin it"<sup>1</sup> The latest effort of those who excuse future war is directed to show that a special kind of war is just, now called a "League war" or a "war to prevent war" But this also ignores the difficulty as to the moral authority of any Body to use any force whatever in international affairs What nations or governments are capable of being judges of others, in a world in which each backs its claims by force or arms? How can any group of States claim to judge morally the action of another State, so long as any one among that group reserves to itself the right to be judge in its own case? The only way to have authority as a policeman is to give up the claim to be a judge of one's own claims

### *Sovereignty in Practice*

The absence of any moral authority in the State-system as a whole or in any section or Group of States is due to the diplomatic and legal assumptions of *Sovereignty* If the relation of States, as expressed in diplomacy, is a relation of bodies of men not subordinate to any moral rule or standard of conduct, then indeed war is natural to States And *Sovereignty* is taken by many to mean independence of moral obligations It is said to

<sup>1</sup> As T H Green showed in his *Lectures on Political Obligation*

imply that Treaties and other forms of international law derive their authority only from the will of the parties. That is to say, a Government may "rightly" cease to keep its word, if that is convenient for itself. This school of thought sometimes maintains that the "morality" governing the relations of States is different from that which governs the relations between individuals, but that is only another way of saying that the former is not "morality" at all. Diplomacy, on that assumption, is only the most convenient way of delaying open breaches of the peace, until one is ready for war. Foreign policy is a form of strategy, and generals and admirals are therefore the best judges of what such policy should be. This attitude is strengthened in practice by the influence of military attachés, of General Staffs and the Committee of Imperial Defence, and by the general neglect among civilians of the study of actual conditions abroad, which makes it easy for the General Staff of any foreign country to pretend to be the whole of that country. Thus "England" is taken to be a navy, "France" an army, and "Germany" a gang of swashbucklers—the "real" England, France and Germany remaining unknown abroad. Indeed it may be doubted whether that other England, France or Germany is known even to its own diplomatists, for what diplomatist meets the men and women in poor homes, whose work maintains the civilisation of his own and of any other country? All diplomatists belong either

to an "officer" class or to some other "upper" class, and they often behave as if they had no moral responsibility to any authority or group of persons outside the frontiers of their own State. That is Sovereignty in practice: it is only a polite name for the ignorance and moral obtuseness of the diplomatic tradition, but such practice makes war inevitable.

### *A Contrary Practice*

If, however, any State has moral authority as an instrument or means for the happiness of its citizens and not as a final end, then it has moral obligations arising out of the purpose for which it exists. Its obligation to keep its word, given in Treaties, is simply the moral principle governing all human intercourse, for the relation between States is one form of the relations between men. States are only men in groups, related to other men in other groups. And no man is able to maintain any relation to other men, without reference to a moral judgment of good and evil. This is not an unpractical ideal. It is a conclusion from the evidence, for the actual practice of States cannot be explained upon the hypothesis of those who say that Sovereignty means moral irresponsibility. Machiavelli and Hobbes and Hegel and the jurists maintaining irresponsible Sovereignty are wrong in their statement of the facts. The existing situation in diplomatic practice as well as in trade

intercourse across frontiers cannot be explained in terms of unmoral "natural" forces. Neither Governments nor States in practice act without regard to a moral standard which is independent of their own wills. It is not true that any Government or State is ever regarded by its own citizens or subjects as having no moral responsibility for keeping its word, for indeed one of the commonest charges against Governments or States not one's own is that they do not keep their word; and this is regarded as useful "propaganda" both in support of one's own State and in weakening the allegiance the citizens of States so accused. But the charge that a Government is immoral in not keeping its word would not be valid, except on the assumption that the will of a Government is not the ultimate criterion in this matter. Some political theorists make the facts more convenient to analyse by omitting, in their analysis, one of the most important—the actual reference to the moral judgment by Governments in conflict, but the result is simply misrepresentation, not realism. Indeed the whole theory of moral irresponsibility in the relations between States is only a psychological "cover" or a form of "rationalisation," in the attempt to make war seem to be either desirable or inevitable. In actual practice no Government dares to declare war except on the ground that its "right" is maintained by that action. No Government writes Hegel or Darwin into its declarations and asserts that it goes to war simply

because it thinks it is stronger than its opponents. Every Government seeks moral excuses for its action, and even if the statesmen concerned are cynical about these excuses, they are compelled at least to appear to be appealing to the moral judgment of those who are not parties to the dispute. Thus every State in practice confesses that it has obligations which do not arise out of its own "will." These obligations are the expression of a moral order superior to all policies of all States, and even if no institution embodies that moral order, its obligations are as binding upon statesmen and upon peoples as the moral standard is binding upon any individual even if it is not embodied in law. Sovereignty repudiating moral responsibility is mere barbarism. There are, indeed, Governments which at certain times may practise Sovereignty in that sense, but in doing so they violate the very essence of all government and therefore undermine their own moral authority, reducing themselves by their own act to the moral status of robber bands. Any Government that does so, repudiates the basis on which alone it can claim allegiance from its citizens or subjects. Thus even when diplomacy uses war or the threat of war, it usually repudiates the idea that it is expressing only power and claims to be expressing right as contrasted with power. Diplomacy in practice therefore repudiates war, even when it uses war!

The practice of States in their intercourse, however, does not always imply a threat of war

States are connected by thousands of Treaties, for commerce and other common advantages, and diplomacy is increasingly concerned with such matters. This State-system rests upon mutual confidence, which is hardly ever disturbed. Even "possible enemies" do not cease to assist the exchange of goods and services across frontiers, and all Governments help other Governments in the arrest of criminals and the protection of health against epidemic disease. If Hobbes and Hegel were right about the facts, no such co-operation of Governments would be more than a trick, but it would be absurd to credit diplomacy with such subtlety! The majority of citizens and officials of any State quite honestly desire to promote the good of citizens in other States by trading with them, carrying their letters or improving their health. But if the State were essentially an instrument of war, it would be better for its possible enemies to be impoverished and diseased. The only theory therefore which represents the facts of the present world is that the State is essentially an instrument of peace in the intercourse of peoples, and that war is a mere survival from primitive times before the modern State existed.

Modern diplomacy therefore should be, not the advocacy of separate "national" aims in rivalry with others, but the pursuit of interests or "goods" common to all civilised peoples, by closer co-operation between their Governments. Machiavelli's methods are obsolete. Some clever fellows will

continue to practise them for many years yet, but the larger outlook and more consistent practice of a diplomacy of co-operation and conference will easily overcome the momentary advantage which is sought by hole-and-corner secrets and tricks. The new methods need skill as well as honesty. Perhaps they need also a new type of person in the diplomatic services and the positions of Foreign Ministers. But the difference between obsolete and modern diplomacy is not a contrast between a wicked "old" diplomacy and a virtuous idealism. The contrast lies between a diplomacy which survives from the Renaissance and one that is suitable for the modern world. The modern State-system needs the closer co-operation of Governments through conference and mutual understanding, in the pursuit of the common interests of the several peoples.

### *The Diplomacy of Peace*

The growth of the diplomacy of peaceful intercourse has been hastened by "technical" co-operation between the other departments of Governments, apart from the Foreign Offices. Thus Treasuries, Ministries of Education, and Transport Departments of several Governments co-operate across the frontiers of States. The officials of the different civil services are now in contact to an extent which was usual only among officers of armed forces, twenty or thirty years ago.



A new world-structure is growing within the traditional State-system, and Sovereignty in foreign affairs is coming to mean not unmoral absolutism but responsibility to the other partners in a co-operative enterprise. The poison of war is being excluded from the body politic by the health-giving diet of civilised intercourse on technical matters, for officials who are competent in the organisation of health-services or education or transport do not concern themselves with national prestige. Natural development in the art of government is making war seem to be more absurd, the more elaborate the preparations for it. Intercourse across frontiers, even on the part of Governments claiming sovereignty, is necessary for the fulfilment of the functions of all government, because government under modern conditions is not mainly police and taxation, but the public organisation of services for health, education and the social conditions in industry. None of these services was known to Machiavelli, Hobbes or Hegel, and they are still unknown to most generals, admirals and diplomatists. But from such services the State-system of the whole world will develop into world-government. When the State is obviously a service of its citizens and not an authority using them for mythical ends, diplomacy will transform "Sovereignty" into moral responsibility and war will be obsolete.

In spite of the obstacles to international trade and the attempts of Dictatorships to prevent

cultural influence coming in from abroad, travel is increasing, taste demands a greater variety of goods from far distant places and scientists and artists in each nation are using the ideas and the skill of similar persons abroad. The world in which Diplomacy first developed, a world of small States under monarchs, without modern industry or transport, was clearly quite different from the world of to-day. Diplomats are now compelled to take account of finance and commerce, and the old Consular system for the assistance of traders has now expanded into an elaborate organisation for trade-information. War is being pushed into the background, even if it lurks there still too dangerously. A saner conception of Sovereignty is coming to be recognised as having closer correspondence to the facts, and in practice, as we have shown, that saner conception has never been altogether forgotten. It remains only to remove altogether from the intercourse of States the threat of war, and the attempts to achieve that end must now be described.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE ELIMINATION OF WAR

FOR the elimination of war the first step must obviously be the provision of some alternative method by which Governments and peoples may attain such legitimate purposes as are still mistakenly believed to be secured by war. Honest and intelligent men and women still serve in war chiefly because they believe that war is the only means by which "aggression" may be prevented and the peaceful development of their own nation secured. Although war may be regarded as evil, it continues to be possible because it is believed to be inevitable. But that belief survives largely because of the almost universal ignorance that other means have been and can be used to attain all legitimate national claims. It survives also because those other means have not yet been adequately embodied in institutions. The first step therefore must be, not merely a change of mental attitude but an improvement in the machinery of government, where it affects the relation between States.

War has been for centuries the traditional and legally recognised method by which changes in the relation between peoples can be brought about

## THE ELIMINATION OF WAR

If the inhabitants of any district become more numerous or wealthy than they were, they may desire to push their trade or to have certain "rights" acknowledged, which were not admitted in former days. Usually no nation is united in such a desire, but a sufficiently influential group within any nation may gain support for their desires from the majority. And in modern times the ambitious group does not confess to anything more than a "defence" of legitimate rights, even if no one but they admits the rights they claim.

War, even in our primitive type of civilisation, is not the only method of adjusting the relations between nations to new circumstances or new ambitions. For example, Norway was separated from Sweden in 1905 without any appeal to force, by agreement between the parties concerned. But this is unusual. Apart from quite minor issues and apart from such adjustment of claims as can be reached by diplomacy, without rousing the passions of any group, the accepted method of change has been war. All Governments and most citizens still envisage the possibility of pressing their views of their interests or rights by force of arms, and the results of war are generally accepted as the basis of a new relationship between States. Therefore, if war is to be eliminated, some other method must be found for making the political adjustments required to give play to inevitable changes of population, wealth, or other natural circumstances. Diplomacy, as it has been shown

above, is the method of attempting to reach agreement between possible opponents in a conflict of rights, but diplomacy does not always succeed

The only other possible method, if agreement between the parties is impossible and war is to be avoided, is decision by some "third party" or judicial authority, based upon the principles of justice. These principles are simply the fundamental assumptions and implications of all law, some of which are embodied in the Treaty-system and the normal intercourse of Governments. As Lauterpacht has shown, in *the Function of Law in the International Community*, there are no disputes whatever between States, which are not "justiciable," in the sense that a decision can be given with respect to them which is based upon legal principles. There are obviously some disputes which Governments *will* not submit to legal discussion and decision, but that is a mere survival of barbarism. If Governments and their peoples were willing, any dispute could be terminated by a legal decision. Thus "political" or "non-justiciable" disputes are not a special class of disputes, unsuitable, in principle or in their legal or moral nature, for judges to deal with. They are only disputes which in fact States, Governments or peoples are determined to keep for fighting about. A century ago no "gentleman" would submit a libel on his conduct to the courts; he preferred to fight a duel about "honour." But in our less simple days, even

gentlemen have more sense Governments, however, have not advanced so far They believe in a special class of grievances as suitable grounds for war, and it has become the fashion to call these not, as in the old days, questions of honour and vital interest, but non-justiciable disputes Irresponsible Sovereignty hides behind a false distinction between disputes

### *Arbitration*

As it was noted in the chapter on history, one of the chief methods for adjusting claims between Governments without war has been arbitration undertaken by some third party This is a very ancient method It has had great success, where it has been used, in the ancient world, in the European Middle Ages and in modern times But it is limited in its applicability, because its use depends upon the consent of the parties to any particular dispute, that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration There have been Treaties binding States to arbitration before disputes arise, but such Treaties have been defective because they have excluded from arbitration certain types of dispute The false conception of State Sovereignty has restricted the sphere of arbitration, because the "will" of the State or its Government has been assumed to be the basis of this method of settlement The Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, however, continues to provide a

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possible alternative to war, within a restricted sphere

### *Judicial Procedure*

A much more important and useful alternative to war is provided by the International Court of Justice, established under the Covenant in 1920, in association with the League. It is held by some jurists that the functions of this Court cover all disputes, and that it could be used in any disputes if Governments so desired. But evidently Governments are unwilling to allow the Court to be used in all their disputes. Under the "Optional Clause" several Governments have agreed to submit certain types of dispute to the judgment of the Court, but many Governments, among them the British Government, have shown great unwillingness to "risk" submitting their claims to judicial decision rather than to the hazard of war.

### *The League System*

The use of new institutions instead of war will evidently have to be acquired by a slow habituation, and for this the machinery of the League of Nations admirably provides. The League system should induce the growth of a more civilised habit with respect to claims to rights, first, in officials and Ministers and, secondly, in peoples. The system is the latest and best attempt to diminish the likelihood of war. It is in some

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ways defective, as part of the machinery of government, but even in its present defective form, it would be more useful, if the chief Governments condescended to use it. A motor-car may not be above criticism, but it would be unjustifiable to say that it was useless, if the critic either could not or would not drive it. The League system is based upon the conception that war is not natural nor inevitable in modern conditions. It implies, therefore, that war can be gradually eliminated by restricting the right to use war as a means for enforcing claims and by the increase of co-operation between Governments for the attainment of certain common interests of their peoples.

In limiting the use of war, the League system proceeds first by binding the members of the League to respect and actually to preserve the territory and independence of all fellow members (Article 10). This clearly implies that no "right" can be acquired by conquest and no situation so acquired can be recognised as constituting a "right." War, we must remember, has hitherto been accepted as a means of acquiring "rights"—not merely "power." This is repudiated. Again the system binds each member to "concern" itself with any war and to take whatever action is "deemed wise and effectual" to maintain peace in case of any threat of war whatever (Article 11). This repudiates the old legal basis of "neutrality." It is no longer possible for a member of the League to do nothing but "stand by," in case of a war



anywhere, or to sell munitions to both sides—as some of our isolationists seem to desire! Other articles of the Covenant provide alternatives to war and means for reducing the tendency to war by frequent conferences and a suggestion, never carried further, for the revision of Treaties (Article 19)

But the League system is no less useful in eliminating war by its admission of new principles of responsibility for what in fact has been the result of past war. For example, in the old days conquest of territory involved a complete transfer of right from the conquered to the conqueror. In the Great War certain territories were conquered by the Allies—districts of the Turkish Empire and German colonies. But the traditional right of conquest was voluntarily limited by the Allies, as members of the League, in the establishment of the mandate system. The Allies were in fact undisputed masters of territories, some of which had formerly been conquered by force of arms by the Turks and the Germans and were held by them by the old right of conquest. But, by way of modifying the right of conquest, the Allies accepted a duty of reporting to the League upon their control of these territories, and they therefore limited their sovereignty, if they did not, as some hold, transfer sovereignty altogether to the League. War thereby lost some prestige, for success in war is not the ground of right for the government of these territories. Similarly in the

Minorities Treaties and Clauses after the Great War, the newly formed States were admitted to the Comity of Nations only when they accepted a limitation of the right of conquest by promising certain rights to racial and religious minorities, which are supposed to be guarded by the League. Again, therefore, war lost some prestige and some of its legal or moral status.

### *The State and Force*

A still more fundamental principle, however, is implied in the positive provisions of the Covenant against war, for in these nothing less is involved than a conception of the State in its external relations directly opposed to that of irresponsible sovereignty. This fundamental principle must be boldly stated. It runs as follows. It is a violation of the very nature of the State that it should appeal to war, or use war, even for its own conception of its own "defence." The State is an organisation for the maintenance of rights, based upon moral judgment. Its moral authority rests upon the implied or acknowledged "common good," the sense of which is the ground for the citizen's obedience. But no moral authority can arise from a mere conflict of forces. Force has its place in the art of government, but its place is *not* the decision of a dispute as to rights. No moral authority is expressed in a decision which rests upon victory by a superior force. Force is irrelevant.

for the moral judgment as to what ought to be done. Thus law and justice, as maintained by the State, imply the elimination of force, as a principle for deciding which of the two conflicting interests or "rights" should prevail. If the State uses force in its police, that force is not a substitute for the force of the parties to any dispute, but a means for preventing force being used as a basis of decision as to claims. The judgment of the judge does not rest upon the existence or use of the police. In deciding upon the rights involved, the police are irrelevant. And therefore the characteristic of the State is not the policeman, but the judge—not the punishment, if any, but the law. The State has moral authority in so far as it eliminates force as a principle for deciding disputes.

### *The Right to go to War*

What then of the disputes of each State in its intercourse with other States? Can any State have the moral authority to demand that its citizens should repudiate in their relations with foreigners the moral principles they accept as between themselves? Has any Government the moral right to refuse to submit its disputes to decision in accordance with moral principles and to assert that in this or that case force shall decide the issue? The answer is—No. The attempt to make that answer operative in practice is embodied in two great Treaties—the Covenant of the

League of Nations and the Kellogg or Paris Pact. The States signatory to those Treaties are, therefore, morally bound to avoid war, in so far as war is excluded by these Treaties. The Governments and the citizens of these States are under a new moral obligation to take positive steps to avoid war, even if they have not yet admitted the further moral obligation to eliminate all war from their intercourse.

Thus in order positively to rid the world of war, a gradual adaptation of policy to new obligations is required by the Treaties named above. Under Article 12 of the Covenant, every State member of the League is bound to submit any dispute with any other member, which is "likely to lead to a rupture," "either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council", and all members are bound to avoid "resort to war" until "three months after the award." That is to say "war" is still recognised under the Covenant as legal and justifiable as a last resort, but not in any case until other specified methods of pressing a nation's claims have been used. Under Article 13 of the Covenant even such disputes as are not "likely to lead to a rupture" and are at the same time "recognised to be suitable," must be submitted to "arbitration or judicial settlement", but this Article leaves the decision as to "suitability" to the decision of the parties. This seems to mean that Governments should use civilised methods when they choose, but should not be bound to

choose them. A vague indication that some disputes are "generally suitable" for civilised methods is contained in the following section of the same Article, which is an admission of the false idea that some disputes are not suitable. Under Article 15 a violation of the pledge to avoid war before submission to civilised procedure is envisaged. Thus it is assumed by the Covenant that it is possible that any Government *may* violate its pledge. If that occurs, the Council is bound to consider and report upon and finally to "refer" the dispute to the Assembly of the League. If the Council agrees on a report about the situation, the Members of the League "agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report." War is, therefore, still contemplated as possible, against one of the parties to the dispute, or against both, for a State may go to war against a party not complying with the report.

### Article 16

Finally under Article 16, if there has been a violation of any of the pledges of the preceding articles, the States Members of the League are bound to sever "all trade or financial relations," to prohibit "intercourse," and to prevent "all financial, commercial and personal intercourse" with the nationals of the "Covenant-breaking State." But it is left to each State to decide for

itself whether the pledges named have in fact been violated by a resort to war. Economic and other boycott would probably lead to war. And this probability is envisaged in the following section of the same Article, which directs the Council to "recommend" what armed force each member of the League "shall contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenant of the League." That is to say, war is to be used when the Council recommends it. War in this case is conceived to be "police action," in the sense that it is the instrument of an international Body, having moral authority, and not the instrument of the judgment of any one Government or Alliance of Governments. The actions to be taken under Article 16 have been called "sanctions," by analogy with the punishment of offenders in civil law and perhaps also with reference to the supposed dependence of civil order upon a police-force. And it has been argued that a "League war" would not be "war" properly so called. The actual killing of men, women and children by "League forces" would then be regarded as we regard such incidental effects of firing on a mob by an armed police. The "aggressor" forces would be regarded as gangsters or as a private armed gang opposing the police, without any moral right.

It is, however, very difficult to realise, in the present condition of the system of government, the ideal of an international police-force having acknowledged moral authority. That is to say, it

would be difficult to distinguish in practice between ordinary war and a "League war." Certainly the influence of the League system ought to imply not—"This is the way each State should go to war," but—"No State ought to go to war, except under these conditions." Article 16 is a statement of an exceptional case, to meet a violation of pledges which really is a repudiation of the League, not a rule to be frequently applied. But many of the arguments in favour of "sanctions" imply that the League is primarily a police-force, and as a result, an altogether disproportionate amount of attention has been given to the problem—What is to be done when the League Covenant is broken? The Article in question is part of a connected system of obligations, many of which have not been fulfilled, for example, the obligation (Article 19) to provide for revision of Treaties and the obligation (Article 8, para 5), to "advise" about the private manufacture of arms. Article 16 is not the most important nor the most significant part of the Covenant, in a world in which the members of the League are still destroying the trade of other members, undermining their currencies, arming their possible enemies and in other ways showing no disposition to act upon the principles involved in the pursuit of a common good. But the moral authority of any Body depends upon its normal action, not upon the promise of its members as to what they will do in an exceptional case. The undoubted obligations

of Article 16 would be more likely to be efficacious in a crisis, if the normal policy of Members of the League were more closely in accordance with the principles upon which the League system is based. What is needed to "strengthen Article 16," as the phrase goes, is not an automatic arrangement for compelling all States to join in a "League war," but a fulfilment of other pledges in the Covenant which would make such a war less likely to be merely a fraudulent excuse for a war of conquest.

### *A League War*

As for eliminating war by the threat of "League" war, a further difficulty arises from the fact that every war is regarded as "police action" by the Government which undertakes it. Every war is excused on the ground that it is the means for obtaining "rights." Every war nowadays is for "defence" and none for "aggression"—in the honest judgment of those common folk who have to fight. Governments are, in general, trusted by their citizens, and the League or the Council of the League is not trusted by the citizens of any State. This is regrettable, but it is a political fact. Any Government can obtain the consent of the majority of its citizens to defy even a carefully considered judgment of the Council. Therefore, if armed force is used in the name of the League, its opponents would feel that they had moral right on their side. A victory by League forces would not



convince them that they were mistaken. It is unlikely, therefore, that when powerful Governments break their pledges, a "League war" would make the situation any better. This situation is all the worse because certain States—Italy, Germany, Japan and Russia are Dictatorships in which the Press is so closely controlled that it is impossible for their citizens to know of an adverse judgment upon their own Government.

The present State-system is largely the result of victory in recent wars. It sets the beneficiaries of past victory over against its victims. Such a system could obtain moral authority for its maintenance—since victory gives no such authority—only from the unforced consent of all, and that consent cannot be obtained, unless there is some real hope of modifying the system in accordance with an impartial adjustment of rights. The results of past wars and the preparations for future wars corrode the moral authority of the League, as well as of the established order in the State-system as a whole. War is a curse which cannot be exorcised by the threat of future war, under any name whatever.

### *Disarmament*

It would perhaps be conceivable that an international Body should have moral authority sufficient to use force as the police are used within a State. But the League is not such a Body. Its moral authority is defective not only because

those States which are not members would not accept its judgment, but also because the chief States which are members show no willingness to have their own rights or claims against them decided by the League. If a substitute for war, as the expression of a claim, is to be found, those against whom the claim is made must show that they are willing to admit claims that are not backed by force. And thus they can do by reducing drastically their own armed forces, for these make it appear that they rely upon force for the maintenance of their own views of the claims against them. But obviously there should not be a one-sided change. If a reduction of arms by one nation merely leads to a greater likelihood that another nation will press its claims by arms, then the situation is not improved. The belief that it is possible to adjust claims by other means than war must be equally powerful in all the chief States, before any State will disarm. That belief has been shaken recently by the establishment of Dictatorships promoting a war-mentality among their citizens, and it may be destroyed. But it is growing meantime in the perception that the "defence" which is desirable is not defence of frontiers nor of rights against other Governments, but "defence" of a whole system of inter-State relations. That system is endangered less by "aggressors" than by those parties which profit by its present form and resist all attempts to change it.

*Members of the League*

The attempt to eliminate war by means of the League Covenant has so far failed chiefly because the relationships of the States members of the League between themselves has not been changed by the Covenant. Great Britain, for example, is still armed in view of a possible war with France, and France in view of a possible war with Italy. Greece is still armed as against Bulgaria and so on. Thus no one of the members of the League is prepared to trust any other so far as to disregard all possibility of war with that other. But precisely such confidence governs the relation between the States of the United States of America and the Commonwealth. In these latter cases, therefore, it is reasonable to say that the arms maintained are not for defence of one member against the other lest that other should violate the common agreement, but that such arms are for the defence of "the system." When the "collective system" in the League is such that it is an assumption of each member that the others are trustworthy, then it will be reasonable to speak of a League Sanction for "the system." Otherwise a League war would simply be an extension of national defence by alliance. But the principle of alliance is fundamentally the same as that of Sovereignty. It is not the formation of a new system but a mere extension of the frontier system of defence against

other Governments No confidence in the moral authority of the League system can rest upon the suspicion of each member that any other member is either willing or able to violate it No confidence in the moral authority of the police of Surrey, for example, can rest upon the promise of the police of the surrounding counties to combine against the Surrey police In such a society force and not right is the governing principle, and that is the principle of war And so long as the security of each member of the League rests not upon confidence in the other members, but upon its own superior force, so long the League system will be ineffectual to eliminate war

As regards the relation of the members of the League to non-member States, the moral authority of a League "sanction" is still more doubtful, for presumably the non-member does not acknowledge the principle of right embodied in the League system Clearly the members of the League may have to act as allies against a non-member State, which appeals to war, but that is only war on the old basis, not a "sanction" with international authority Only an inclusive League can be regarded as "international," in contrast with partial alliances And further, certain members of the League promote, in trade policy, the export of the means to make war for the advantage of all and sundry Can it be seriously argued that the League is a system for maintaining peace, if its chief members make money by the trade in arms?

*International Authority*

The attempt to diminish war by Articles 10, 12, 13, 15 and 16 of the Covenant fails also because the chief Governments will not in practice make their armed forces into the instruments of an authority other than that of the separate Sovereign States. This could be done partly by the admission of the right of some international Body to decide upon the *amount* of such armed forces, which each State should control. The first aspect of irresponsible Sovereignty which should be destroyed is military sovereignty, that is to say, the right of each Government or State to decide for itself and without agreement with others upon the amount of armed forces necessary for its "defence." All attempts to reach international agreement upon the reduction or limitation of arms have come up against this. The nations vanquished in the Great War were compelled to submit to the judgment of others, as to the amount of their armed forces. Quite apart, therefore, from actually reducing any armed forces, the nations which enforced that principle on others should have accepted it for themselves. Some advance towards an admission of the principle was made in the Washington Treaty of 1923 and the London Treaty of 1930. But even the Members of the League have never admitted their obligation to submit to international judgment the amount of their armed forces. Therefore these forces are not in fact international.

in their moral status and cannot be recognised as instruments of an international judgment

Again, some Governments called Dictatorships explicitly repudiate the right of any other authority to decide either upon the amount of their armed forces or the use to be made of them. And the so-called Democracies, in external affairs, generally practise the principles of Dictatorship at least in this matter. Also in professed Dictatorships the subjects of the Governments have no news of any foreign opinion or action which their Governments do not desire them to have. These subjects are imprisoned if they criticise their Governments, the schools inculcate blind faith in the Party in control; and the public generally is under the complete domination of the few in power. In such a world, an international authority such as the original design for the League implied, is quite impossible. The League system, in so far as it provides a positive alternative to war, has been obstructed and rendered ineffectual by the maintenance of military sovereignty on the part of its chief members—Great Britain and France, as well as by the more open disdain of its principles in the action of Japan, Germany and Italy. An international police force maintaining the moral authority of a State-system, accepted by all, may be an ideal, but it could be realised only when the armed forces of the several States were reduced drastically to the level of a police, without ability to attack other police, and when all Governments openly

acknowledged an authority higher than their own judgments, for decision as to their rights. The acknowledgment of such an authority must be based upon moral judgment, not upon submission to superior force.

### *The Kellogg Pact*

Perhaps because of the defects in the moral authority of the League system, the Government of the United States and some other Governments promoted the signature on 27th August, 1928, of the Kellogg or Paris Pact for the "outlawry" of war "as an instrument of national policy." By that Treaty all members of the League, as well as all other important States have renounced *all* war—not merely "war before arbitration," undertaken by any Government on its own judgment. A "League war" is conceived not to be renounced, because it would not be "an instrument of national policy." By the text of the Paris Pact, in its second article, each Government is bound to submit *all* disputes to some other method of settlement, not war. It may seem, therefore, that war undertaken by any Government on its own judgment is no longer possible—but in fact no Government has made the smallest reduction in its preparation for future war, as a result of the Pact. Why not? Not because each Government disbelieves in the professions of other Governments, but because the professions in the Pact are not taken to mean

declares its belief in its own right to use armed force Under the Covenant the Members of the League have given up their right to decide what is self-defence, although they have not given up the right of war for any reason they choose, except during three months after a report by the Council

### *The Reign of Law*

But the likelihood of war cannot be discovered by subtle analysis of the texts of Treaties Plainly all the Great Powers are under arms in preparation for a future war No Government of any of these Powers and perhaps no Government at all believes that other Governments will submit *all* disputes as to its claims, to third-party judgment And probably, if politicians in control of Governments could be induced to give a clear answer, all would acknowledge that in their own case they did not propose to submit *all* their own nation's claims to the judgment of any Body on which foreigners may sit That is to say, military sovereignty necessitates preparation for war, in spite of the Covenant and the Paris Pact and the first steps towards eliminating war have been good enough—indeed remarkable in view of the obsolete ideas of most of those in control of public affairs, but they have not carried us very far

In the relations between States war cannot be eliminated, until "the reign of law" is accepted voluntarily by at least the more powerful States



Not the nature of things, nor "human nature," nor anything else but a primitive habit of mind makes war still possible. Very few even among jurists and philosophers seem to understand that the absence of a coercive sanction and the defects or limitations of actual law do not justify a violation of the basic principle of all law by the use of armed forces to support one's own claim or one's own judgment of that claim. That basic principle, however, has been admirably stated by Lauterpacht as follows

"There may be gaps in a statute or in statutory law as a whole there may be gaps in the various manifestations of customary law. There are no gaps in the legal system taken as a whole. The first function of the legal organisation of the community is the preservation of peace. Its fundamental precept is, 'There shall be no violence.' But this primordial duty of law is abandoned and the reign of force is sanctioned as soon as it is admitted that the law may decline to function by refusing to adjudicate upon a particular claim, at least to the extent of pronouncing that violence must not be used for the purpose of enforcing it"<sup>1</sup>

Behind that conception of law lies a great philosophy and a civilised conception of the State, which is by no means admitted generally. It was forgotten or misunderstood in the nineteenth century and is unknown to most of the politicians and officials who control the relations between States. That philosophy implies that every State

<sup>1</sup> Lauterpacht, *Function of Law in the International Community*, p. 64

is an organ of an international moral order, which is superior to all Governments and States, by reference to which the acts of States and Governments in their intercourse are to be judged morally. The conception was stated in modern terms first by Franciscus a Victoria and by Suarez. It was explained by Grotius in terms of a "law of nature." In more recent times, it was expressed in English by Westlake and by T. H. Green, and among our contemporaries by Krabbe, Kelsen, Verdross and others.

In practical politics the influence of a great thinker is not powerful until some centuries after his death. The principles of toleration and free enquiry, for example, for which Erasmus argued, were not accepted generally, even by the intelligent, until about three centuries had passed since he had died. But on the other hand, thought is only one expression of a general movement of life, and improvements sometimes take place in social conditions long before it is obvious that they have occurred. So in the case of war, the conception of the State which will eventually make war ridiculous may be of slow growth, but even now the habits of Governments and peoples are undermining the pernicious practices incidental to irresponsible military sovereignty. The League system provides for the pursuit of common interests by many States in co-operation. The organisations for health and transport, the discussions of issues which seem insignificant and the maintenance

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of permanent officials of the League, the International Labour Office and the International Court—all induce the Governments to act as agents for a good common to all nations and not as rivals. The habit of conference and co-operation may affect the institutions of the State-system so radically as to provide many substitutes for war, when changes of population or wealth make a readjustment of established rights desirable. And so it may turn out that we have advanced farthest in the elimination of war, not when we were making direct efforts to prevent it, but when we establish and use institutions which disregard the possibility of its occurrence. A habit of co-operation with other nations upon seemingly unimportant matters may reduce to absurdity the older habit of arming ourselves against these others, for any purpose whatever.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE ABOLITION OF WAR

CHANGES in institutions promote new habits, and new habits produce new beliefs. But it is equally true that changed mental attitudes change institutions. Thus, if war is to disappear as cannibalism has, a change must be made in the attitude of men towards their fellow-men of different race, religion or language. The psychological sources of war must be dealt with directly through some form of education. The dominant complex of "defence" must be dissolved. The social influence of an officer class must be undermined by the establishment of new social standards, and a much more general suspicion of traditional phrases such as "king and country" or "the national honour" must be established. The veil of romance must be removed from the uncomfortable truth that soldiers are not trained to die for their country, but to kill other men, and the unsavoury connections between glory and cash much be exposed. All this must be done not only in schools and universities, but also in all forms of adult education, on the public platform, in the cinema and on the radio. The final attack upon war is not to be made among the politicians and the officials, or

by the signing of Treaties, or even by the establishment of new institutions, but by the spiritual and intellectual enlightenment of the Nobodies who have fought all wars and will always have to fight whatever wars may occur

In order, however, to make clearer the conception of psychological change supported in this book, two other conceptions may be contrasted with it. One is that belief in Socialism, as opposed to profit-seeking, must be established before war can be abolished, the other is that devotion to a World-State, as opposed to patriotism, is the only way. Both these ideas imply great psychological as well as institutional changes, but neither is accepted here, as the best policy for abolishing war

## *Socialism and War*

As for Socialism, it is argued that war is the result of profit-seeking under the capitalist system, especially in its imperialistic form. But wars occurred long before there was any capitalism, and many wars have been caused by religious and racial influences, not directly connected with the ownership of capital or its use in the search for profit. It is improbable, therefore, that the issue between Socialism and Capitalism is the only one which must be decided before we can abolish war. Socialism in only a few States might increase the danger of war from Fascist States and to wait for Socialism to be established in all States before

reducing the danger of war directly is clearly unwise. On the other hand, some advance has been made in reducing the likelihood of war, for example between Canada and the United States, without any change in the capitalist system. It seems likely, therefore, that we can make still further progress towards abolishing war, whether or not any great change in the economic system occurs. This is not an argument for or against either Socialism or Capitalism. It is simply an argument for concentrating directly upon the abolition of war, as was done in the case of slavery, without waiting for other or more drastic social changes.

There are, indeed, quite definite and tangible financial "interests" which are served by war, and some of these "interests" can very easily identify themselves with the "national" interests. For example, the mine-owners on the Rand before the Boer War and the American companies in Cuba before the Spanish-American war certainly had an eye to business in their support of the "national" interest by war. Capitalism and Imperialism do sometimes lead to war. But capital-owners, and particularly those capital-owners who invest abroad could not have such evil influence over public policy, if diplomacy itself were less primitive.

Clearly no one knows what the world would be like if there were Socialist Governments in the chief States. Perhaps if Governments practised in their international intercourse the same principles

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as they professed in their domestic policy, then Socialist Governments would keep the peace. But Governments can maintain contradictory policies, and we have had bitter experience of Governments claiming to be "democratic." Democracy means, at least, the submission of disputes to argument. Democracy repudiates force as a final test of what right or interest should prevail. And yet, Governments claiming to be democratic are armed to the teeth. They repudiate the idea that all their disputes should be settled by argument and legal decision. They pay spies against other democracies. They make alliances, not with democracies rather than dictatorships, but with any other State which has enough force to assist them in "overbalancing" their possible enemies. And the Governments in these so-called democracies are supported in all such policies by the great majority of their citizens. The growth of democracy in government should have involved the complete security of peace, at least between democracies, but it has not. Some new situation may be created by a transition from democracy to socialism in a number of states. But recent experience is not reassuring. It is too easy for even a Government claiming to be Socialist to use the old plea of "defence," to excuse the maintenance of powerful armaments. The "defence" of Socialism or of a Proletarian Revolution is the same old excuse. It may be justified in any particular case but it certainly does not reduce the danger of war.

In plain terms, war will continue to be possible until the relations between States are conceived by Governments and peoples in an entirely new way. Traditional Socialism contains no such new conception. It is mainly concerned with the control by national or at least federal Governments, in separate States, over the means of production, and it is not, even in economic terms, concerned with international or inter-State affairs. The affection for foreign persons of the same social class or of the same political opinions or a theory of control in economic issues is not a sufficient basis for governmental diplomacy and administrative co-operation between States. The right policy, therefore, leading to the abolition of war is a direct attack upon that particular evil.

### *The World State*

Another means of abolishing war is said to be the repudiation of patriotism and the establishment of devotion to a World-State. This is the plan of H. G. Wells. It escapes the difficulty of international affairs by eliminating all international affairs! If Governments have to submit to a single superior, they can be kept in order, and presumably the World Government, whatever else it does, will not indulge in "war." But this is the mediæval conception of peace, carried on through the Renaissance, and advocated by all Emperors who were anxious to rule the world, in order to give



it peace. Nowadays the World-State is assumed to be established by the consent of all or most nations, and not through conquest of all others by one. In the last stage of the argument, the possible opponents to the World-State are supposed to have died of war and disease, before the remaining faithful establish their heaven. Prophecy cannot be disputed, but the World-State or World-Government, under a single Cabinet, is not a practical purpose for policy, even if it were desirable. The plan implies not a solution of the problem of international relations, but an imaginary situation in which there is no problem. The Governments of the world do not agree on quite minor points, and are not, therefore, likely to agree to abolish themselves. And besides, if they could be induced to agree on a certain few points, it would be quite unnecessary to abolish them. Again, to sweep the world clean of Sovereign States and begin civilisation all over again, is hardly a desirable plan of action. The practical policy for the gradual elimination of war has been suggested in the preceding chapters. It is an improvement in diplomacy and a submission of all disputes to legal decision, accompanied by a rapid reduction of armaments and an effectual control of the private trade in armaments. If that had been secured, war would be unlikely.

The preparation of the mind for a world without war must allow for what is good in the existing system and must use that good. A policy based

only upon a recitation of evils tends to be Utopian, because it imagines instead of observing what is good. But even the world as it is could not exist, if it were only a predatory scramble for wealth and power. Capital-owners may be objectionable, but peace is already more secure over a much greater area of the earth than it was before Capitalism, and we do not know how much farther we can go, without radical transformation of bad situations, until we have used much more fully such good institutions as already exist. As for the World-State—if the State itself is essentially a means of contact across frontiers of language and culture, the State-system can be improved without being abolished.

### *Patriotism Transformed*

Patriotism is sometimes said to be the source of passion in war. Love of one's own country is said to prevent peace because it is a hindrance to "World loyalty." But the "world" in this sense is a mythological entity, even more ambiguous than Britannia or Deutschland. Peace is not a young woman in a night-gown, playing with the terrestrial globe. It is better to improve Britannia's character than to repudiate her in favour of a ghost. In plain words, patriotism must be transformed, not abolished, and it has already in most civilised countries gone through so many transformations that another ought to be possible.

Patriotism is not necessarily bound up with guns and flags and drums. The trouble about war is not that it implies dying for one's country, but that it requires killing for one's country, and such killing does no country any good. Patriots in the modern world ought to abolish war, if for no other reason, at least for the sake of their own country. In practice patriotism arises out of the simple and natural affection for what is familiar, but this is worked up by political propaganda and bad history into fear of what is strange. The dissolving of the fear of the unknown is a slow process, but it has been occurring at least for the past five centuries. At present the positive alteration in the character of love for what is familiar is the fundamental problem in the making of peace. That is to say, the new generation must be given, not merely a new feeling towards foreigners, but also a new attitude towards its own country. That is the transformation of patriotism. England or France or Germany then would be felt to be, not "Powers" nor treasures to be "defended," but forms of service to the whole world in the development of civilised life. This was the conception of Mazzini, an Italian of much greater intelligence than Machiavelli or Mussolini. It is in the tradition of European civilisation at least since the Middle Ages, but what was once an aspiration has now become a statement of obvious facts. Before our modern "nations" existed, when learning was Latin and religious organisation

largely alien everywhere, civilised life might have seemed to have no reference to differences of language or custom. But since the Renaissance learning, culture and idealistic effort have taken root in the separate communities now called "nations" English and French and German and Italian stand for more than the habits and dialects of unlettered mediæval villagers. Each national name expresses a fine culture, a tradition of civilised life and a relationship of blood and bone between the thinkers and the rest of each community. But each nation has reached its present civilisation by continual interchange of goods, services and ideas with all other nations. Contemporary civilisation in England, France or Germany, has its roots in a separate soil, but its flowers and fruit are entirely due to the pollen borne on the wind from afar. No nation would be what it now is, but for its dependence upon other nations. England owes her literature partly to Italian tales used by Shakespeare, not to speak of Hebrew influences. She owes her present arts to the influence of Beethoven, a German, and Cézanne, a Frenchman. Her health is dependent upon work done by Pasteur. And she has more than paid her debt in what other nations have been taught by Newton, Darwin and Lister, not to speak of her poets, her administrators and political philosophers. One may be proud of one's country for so great a store of good things given to all the world. Such a patriotism is nobler than that of guns and

flags and drums; and it holds within it as fierce an idealism for the future service of the world through one's own country as any child's game of conquest and domination. Neither the teachers nor the writers who are forming the new generation seem yet to have any genuine emotional grasp of that new patriotism, but the old patriotism is simply a misrepresentation of facts. It is not true in the modern world that any nation can injure the culture, the health or the happiness of another by war, without injury to itself.

But if each man's country is, for his own thought and emotion, a means for his service of the world at large, every other country is for each man a place where other men are working at the same task. If France is a name, not for an armed camp, but for a company of men like ourselves, from whose labour and genius we derive advantage, then there is no need for defence against France. Then the work done by the Government of France in the promotion of order or health or knowledge in France is work done for the advantage of England and Germany and Italy. Similarly each country may be regarded by its neighbours as a community with which closer contacts are desirable. The human person gains in individuality, originality and vigour not by isolation from others, but by intercourse with others, and so each local group of men and each nation gains from the contributions to civilised life made by every other. The working of these contributions into one

characteristic type of civilisation in each community—that is peace. Peace is not the mere avoidance of quarrels. It is the intercourse of civilised communities. It is the necessary foundation of a future civilisation much more broadly based and much more nobly designed than any known to history. When that is understood, it will not be necessary to argue against war by reciting the horrors which result from it, for war will have become obviously absurd.

### *The Common Good*

The fundamental issue is the relation of each person to the community of which he is a member. It is a problem of service and of the common good to be served. The traditional contrast between war and peace is that the citizen is supposed to "serve" in war, but not in peace. And the attractiveness of war, for the best of each generation, has been due to the fact that war is the supreme example of service of a common good. Comradeship has been found in war-service, and the best men and women desire comradeship so much that they are easily induced to do anything, if they can do it with the full approval of their fellows and in the deepest intimacy with them. Hard and unpalatable labour, extreme danger and bitter pain have been found endurable in war, because of the belief that it required service of a common good. Soldiers are paid for their service and successful

commanders honoured and rewarded, but no one supposes that the soldier or the commander serves only for what he can get out of it for himself. Men are willing to die in war precisely because they are not serving themselves, but some common good, which they know they may never share. The nobility of those who serve in war is not decreased by the fact that they are mistaken; for indeed what gives war its strongest hold is what is good in it. But the service of a common good is possible in peace. Not only "defence" is a common good and not only fighting is service. It was natural, as was suggested in the first chapter, that in primitive times "defence" should seem to be the most urgently needed common good and that this defence should be conceived in terms of violence to resist violence. But we ought, by this time, to have become a little more civilised.

### *The Conception of Peace*

The dominant conception of peace has been entirely negative. Peace has been taken to mean "eternal rest" or at least a cessation of all effort. In the early religious protests against war, the alternative described or implied was an inertia which was not likely to be attractive to the finest men and women. Eternal rest may have been a natural conception of heaven for those slaves or other toilers who were tired of the sort of life to which they were condemned, but there have

always been many who have said with Achilles in the *Odyssey* (XI 485) "Speak not to me comfortably of death. Rather would I live upon earth as the hireling of another, of a landless man and poor, than be a king among the dead." But whatever the confusion of peace with death or sleep and of war with life, these analogies are false. They are based on the primitive poetry of bards singing to warriors after battle. They are continued in the literature of the slave-civilisations of Greece and Rome which still dominate our education. And they imply the moral standards of military slave-owners. Thus the ordinary work of peace—cooking and carrying and manufacture and the sale of goods, is despised as slavish or mean. The "working class" is assumed to be a "lower" order. Women, as General Goering of the Hitler Revolution has told us, are only "child-bearers for future wars and sweet comforters for the tired survivors of the last war." And "real" life is believed to be not the creative labour nor the skill of workers, on which civilisation depends for its maintenance and development, but a furious muscular effort to find "glory." The Homeric ideals of the slave-owners of Greece and Rome are absorbed by new generations in the education of the Western world and perpetuated by being mingled with the romanticism of mediæval chivalry and with the gentility of the eighteenth century. War is in our bones, in the traditional disdain of common labour, and peace is despised and dishonoured.



men who, in the uniforms of war, are treated as "heroes," are despised as postmen or coal-miners. and perhaps they despise themselves when they return from war, for everyone assumes that in the ordinary occupations of peace each is working mainly for as much as he can get out of it for himself, although in war he does not serve for pay. Women also, who are honoured in their war services, are given no honour at all as textile workers or wives in poor homes. Our moral standards are defective. The common services of peace must be honoured before we can devote to an alternative ideal the enthusiasm that has so far been wasted upon war.

War can be abolished, therefore, only when peace means service of a common good. The black magic of service in war must be cast out by the white magic of service in peace. To argue that war is painful or destructive or futile is of less importance than to establish an alternative enthusiasm for service of a common good in peace. But that would involve a revolution in the moral standards now governing character and conduct. It would mean, in plain words, a claim to honour on behalf of the common labour of simple folk, and a denial of any right to life or the enjoyment of life to those who do not take their share in the work of the community. It would mean a general disdain for wealth inherited or obtained by tricks from the common store. And whatever the effects on its institutions of such

## THE ABOLITION OF WAR

changes in the prevalent attitude of any community, clearly it would involve new manners and customs. The manners of a society of equals each of whom was honoured for work done, would be very different from ours. There is a danger of sentimentalism, however, when such a phrase is used as the "dignity of labour." Mediæval craftsmen appear as ghosts in many schemes for reform, and worse still, the monotonous and back-breaking toil of primitive agricultural labour is idealised by literary Utopians. There are many forms of labour still in existence which are slavish and should be abolished, and the past is not to be admired. The honour due to work for the common good is to be given to actual workers to-day—to engine-drivers and rivetters and textile-workers and postmen. These are in the regiments of peace. To allow a situation to continue, such as the present, when these men and women can be called from their honourable work to kill and make the instruments of killing in a new war—that is merely barbarism. And to refuse them honour in peace, giving it to them in war, is to shut one's eyes to reality.

It may be said that no nation can do otherwise so long as its neighbours remain barbaric, that it would be dangerous to undermine the honour paid to war-service and dangerous to claim all honour for peace-service, until the same movement succeeds abroad. But this is a mere excuse for the disinclination to disturb an ancient tradition. It is

on a level with the argument that you may cheat the grocer because the grocer might cheat you. There is no valid reason against beginning the new era in any place. If that plan has its risk, the alternative is by no means safety! But the idea of risk to any one nation is itself another form of the old "defence" complex, and that will be finally undermined only when peace itself is seen to be the greatest common good of all the family of nations. In the old days each nation fought for its own peace, as each family drew its own water from its own well. Now peace is not secure for any, unless it is shared by all, as a public water-supply displaces private water-wells. Peace is not the mere absence of danger from foreigners, but the positive acceptance of their services in a common task. The railwayman and textile-worker are not serving one nation only. The artist and scientist are not "balancing" their export of ideas. The interlocking of services across frontiers is essential to their efficacy. This is a fact, not merely an ideal. The recognition of the world as it is would be enough to convince us of the excellence of a peace shared by all, if our eyes were not still blinded by the traditional history. Thus every State is an integral part of a single system of government, for the promotion of certain common goods shared by all nations and each State, so far from needing "defence" from others, is of assistance to the citizens of other States, both by maintaining order in its own

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territory and in promoting the interchange of the services of peace

### *The New World*

Such an attitude may be expressed in deliberate policy, but a change in the prevalent attitude in any community is not due only to choice or will. It is partly the effect of changed conditions, biological and sociological. The traditional admiration for war in a slave-society was caused partly by such conditions as a large birth-rate and large mortality-rate for infants, devitalisation of women, an expectation of life at birth of about 30 or 40 years, and a premature decay of survivors at 40, owing to disease. Thus war was assumed to be good in an immature society of the youthful, with death and disease at the doors. Communities before the industrial era also depended upon muscle, human and animal, as a motive-power in agriculture and crafts. Therefore men were simple and insensitive. They lived in small groups, each almost self-sufficient. War was hardly more uncomfortable than peace. Most of the members of these small communities were afraid of anything strange, and trusted the authority of the elders who survived or of an old tradition which was believed to have a non-human origin. The astronomical universe was imagined to be very small and to be in essence a stage for a short human drama with the very simplest plot. The

traditional social system was believed to be as inevitable as the course of the stars, and until quite recently, it was not understood that social changes could be made by deliberate policy. In such a world, war was readily accepted as part of the nature of things.

The world to-day, however, is quite different. The birth-rate and infant mortality-rate in Western countries have fallen greatly since about 1870. Women are therefore freer to attend to public affairs, and many women prefer peace to war! The expectation of life at birth is now about 59, and those over 50 are not devitalised by disease and famine. Society, therefore, is more mature and less inclined to nursery politics or "playing soldiers." Power-machinery has displaced muscle-power or "man-power", and therefore a less somnolent, more sensitive type of man and woman is becoming commoner. Education is no longer the privilege of a small caste, and the education of Nobodies to-day is considerably more exciting, more inducive to new interest than was the best education of a century ago. Health also is more secure in all Western nations. Common folk are no longer devitalised by insanitary habits and endemic diseases. Their minds, therefore, are more stable and less clouded. Travel has become possible for those with small incomes. Tastes have arisen in most communities which can be satisfied only by foreign trade, and most men and women in large city-areas are accustomed to meet strangers.

and willing to try new experiments in food, clothing and daily customs. The authority of the aged is now challenged, because decay is not revered, and traditional beliefs and customs are revealed by history to have the same sources as any other habits. In this new world, therefore, war is naturally felt to be obsolete. A certain impatience with it is shown, even by those who prepare for it. The mental atmosphere of a modern community is unfavourable to cannibalism, torture, slavery—and war.

The increase of leisure for those who work for a living and still more the increase in the different ways of using leisure will make ordinary life less monotonous, and remove therefore the attraction of war as an escape from boredom. The advance of knowledge and the finer training of the emotions in the new education will increase the number of the interests of common folk, and if democratic social standards displace flunkeyism and snobbery, the rituals and decorations of war will seem childish. The whole social system is changing all over the world, not only by deliberate policy but also under the influence of biological differences, in some populations, of scientific inventions and almost accidental discoveries. Clearly at any moment there may be a set-back towards war, for simple and unstable minds will always be attracted by some aspects of barbarism. Economic distress may make large numbers reckless. Privation and unemployment provide fuel for incen-

diary demagogues, and such leaders tend to escape their difficulties by promoting war against foreigners. War may be endured or welcomed. The preparations for it may become more disastrous than they are even now. And blind leaders in any nation may precipitate a world conflict, because they cannot see where their policy will end. But the common man to-day is sceptical. The old excuses are not likely to preserve their old force, and it becomes increasingly difficult to find new excuses for such an absurdity as war between civilised peoples. But whether war comes in the near future or not, the birth of new enthusiasms and the inevitable pressure of a new society in a new world will, sooner or later, make it entirely obsolete.

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